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Yoram Schweitzer
Over the last few years, women suicide bombers have earned the dubious distinction 
of appearing more newsworthy than their male counterparts. While investigative 
reporting on a male suicide bomber is often extensive, coverage of a female suicide 
bomber seems to result in more widespread media exposure. This may serve as 
another expression of the prevailing belief that women, unlike men, must have 
unique  and  excessively  abnormal  reasons  for  committing  what  is  deemed  as  a 
distinctly non-feminine act.
The media’s fascination with women suicide bombers is a curious phenomenon. 
In our contemporary era, one might not expect the excessive attention to female 
suicide bombers, certainly not when it is not an isolated phenomenon. Moreover, 
the very participation of women in terrorism and even the phenomenon of women 
suicide bombers is hardly a recent development. Women have taken part in terror 
attacks since at least the nineteenth century, and have played a role in the modern 
terrorism that has gained momentum since the 1960s. Prominent examples include 
the female participants in the campaign waged by the FLN during the Battle of 
Algiers in the late 1950s and early 1960s; the terror campaigns of the Baader-Meinhof 
gang in Germany and the Italian Red Brigades in Italy from the 1970s to the mid-
1980s; and the Palestinian hijackings at the end of the 1960s to the mid-1970s. 
Nor is female participation in suicide bombings a new phenomenon, as women 
have numbered among its ranks almost since it first appeared in the Middle East 
in the early 1980s. The first female suicide bomber, Sana Mekhaidali, was sent by 
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP/PPS) in 1985 and successfully targeted 
an IDF convoy in Lebanon, killing five soldiers. Dubbed “the bride of the south,” 
her act was followed by five other women dispatched in Lebanon, all acting on 
behalf of a secular pro-Syrian agenda. Subsequent decades witnessed the spread 
of female suicide bombers to other areas around the globe. Groups from Sri Lanka, 
the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, and 
elsewhere emulated the Lebanese example and operated female suicide bombers 8    Introduction
along with their male counterparts. Recent examples of women suicide bombers 
include a member of TIKKO (the Turkish Workers Villagers Independent Army) who 
detonated her bomb at the entrance to a mosque in April 2006; a Sri Lankan woman 
who blew herself up near a Colombian army base on April 25, 2006, wounding the 
commander of the Sri Lankan armed forces; and Sonja B, a German convert to Islam 
who was seized in Germany on June 2, 2006 to foil her planned suicide attack in 
Iraq.
Between 1985 and 2006, there have been more than 220 women suicide bombers 
(figure 1), representing nearly 15 percent of the overall number of actual suicide 
bombers around the world and those intercepted in the final stages before the attack. 
A suicide attack is defined here as a violent, politically motivated action intended 
consciously and with prior intent – even if thwarted in its final stages – by one or 
more individuals who kills him/herself in the course of the operation together with 
his/her chosen target. The guaranteed and preplanned death of the perpetrator is 
a prerequisite for the operation’s success.1 The enlistment of women from Belgium, 
India, Iraq, Turkey, and the West Bank territories for suicide attacks in 2006 indicates 
that their role continues, and may in fact represent a growing phenomenon. 
Yet notwithstanding the familiarity of the phenomenon – or at the very least, its 
lack of singularity – there seems to have been a disproportionately large interest 
in women suicide bombers, and the question is why. Certainly the dominance of 
Figure 1. Female Suicide Bombers, by Targeted Areas, 1985-2006
Source: Database compiled by Yoram Schweitzer Introduction    
traditional  gender  stereotypes  is  a  factor:  despite  whatever  social  and  political 
advances they have made, women are still overwhelmingly regarded as the gentler 
sex, whose innate maternal nature makes them far less likely candidates for suicide 
bombers. Their role in the suicide bombing arena has been characterized as shocking, 
if not outright inconceivable. Since in many cultures women are perceived as the 
gentle and naive creators of human life, their participation in acts of carnage and 
devastating pain has aroused a mixture of surprise and repulsion and elevated the 
level of public interest. 
The  involvement  of  women  in  suicide  bombings  spawns  a  host  of  related 
questions. Are women’s motivations and performances different in comparison to 
those of their male counterparts? Are they more (or less) determined and dedicated 
to the cause? Are they more radical or extreme than the men in their perceptions 
towards the path their struggle has taken? Are they more emotional about it?  Do they 
need a longer or shorter period of preparation for the mission? Are they involved 
in the operational decision-making process? Do they aspire to be more involved in 
determining the strategy of their mission?
Examination reveals that despite their high profile, women play a marginal role in 
their organizations, both numerically and in the corporate structure (even if in some 
areas such as Turkey they comprised around 40 percent of all the suicide bombers, 
in Sri Lanka, 20-25 percent, and in Chechnya, 43 percent). They are definitely not the 
leaders in their organizations, but serve rather as pawns and sacrificial lambs. They 
are not responsible for the planning of the operations and are actually dispatched to 
the missions with barely a say as to their targets, the timing of the bombing, and the 
way the operation should be conducted.  For the most part they have not otherwise 
been trained as fighters, and a suicide mission in itself requires little investment in 
job training, in terms of either time or money. Indeed, for many of the women, the 
contribution of a suicide mission to their national or religious struggle is precisely 
that: a form of employment in the male-dominated domain of suicide bombing.
Furthermore,  there  are  operational  exigencies  that  have  dictated  the  use  of 
female suicide bombers, despite religious or cultural constraints. Women arouse less 
suspicion and are better able to clear checkpoints and other security obstacles. In 
addition, they do not have to undergo special training or possess specialized combat 
skills, and therefore they offer an efficient use of human resources. Moreover, the 
fact that a woman attracts greater media attention is an asset in and of itself to the 
organization that sent her. The organization and its particular cause or grievances 
will  almost  automatically  enjoy  greater  exposure,  which  in  large  measure  is  an 10    Introduction
immediate aim of the bombing itself. In turn, morale and enthusiasm among the 
rank and file are heightened 
These parameters are illustrated by a Fatah operative in charge of a terrorist 
cell who dispatched two female suicide bombers. He stated that he eventually sent 
one of them on her mission after rejecting her request several times previously 
because it was nearly impossible to have a man bypass security arrangements. In 
the second case, the woman worked with a male partner. As such, she served as 
both a human bomb and as a cover, lending the two suicide bombers an innocent 
appearance  of  a  romantic  couple.  The  handler,  however,  also  mentioned  his 
propaganda considerations, knowing his choice of bombers would demonstrate to 
the Arab world and the world at large that even women are active participants in 
the Palestinian struggle aspect. Not only did the women arouse the usual excessive 
media attention, but he noted that there was even a katsida, a traditional Islamic 
ballad, written by a Saudi prince in their honor.2   
And finally, the question arises: how much is this gender-related phenomenon in 
fact a function of gender-related issues? More specifically, to what extent is feminism 
on the agenda of the women themselves or those who send them? Are these bombers 
in fact dying for equality? Alternatively, is this feminist agenda primarily a Western 
prism artificially imposed on a non-Western context?
The questions are complicated and multi-dimensional. Female suicide bombers 
appear almost exclusively in societies that are heavily traditionalist and conservative, 
where women lack equal rights and their status in society is much lower than that of 
their male counterparts. In some of the dispatching organizations such as the Kurdish 
PKK and the Sri Lankan LTTE, leaders promised that women participating in such 
operations would pave the way for other women to enjoy an equal status and to be 
emancipated. Although women were already integrated into the army, they did not 
earn commanding positions, and hence the promise – ultimately empty – of gender 
advancement for their female colleagues if they volunteered for suicide operations. 
Thus, those sending the women may be exploiting the modern cry for emancipation 
of women: proving that women are equally eligible to die alongside men for a 
nationalist or religious cause ostensibly indicates an equivalency of value. 
How much have the women themselves seen their actions as acts of feminism, 
designed to advance the cause of women’s equality in their societies? While operators 
may have used the bombings to proclaim their would-be progressive gender outlook, 
do women themselves see their act as their contribution to the feminist cause? Are 
there feminist overtones, beyond the nationalist / religious motivations? Evidence Introduction    11
suggests that if the women themselves attribute any feminist goals to their actions, 
this is a rationale imposed after the fact. Far from the primary catalyst that launched 
them on their mission, advancing gender interests is sometimes an imported cause 
meant to redeem – if not glorify – the aberration of a female suicide bomber.
Thus, along with a smart utilization of human resources, women’s participation 
in suicide bombings has been used as a propaganda tool by their organizations and 
served the dispatchers’ drive to project an image of participation by all segments 
of their respective societies in the ethno-national and/or religious struggles. Yet 
despite the rhetoric and the temporary honor these women enjoy in implementing 
their tasks, they have not succeeded in promoting any of the egalitarian agendas 
that hovered around them. Therefore, the concept of dying for equality translates 
into negative gains on both levels: it was neither achieved nor apparently was it the 
main purpose of the volunteering participants, albeit it was at times explicitly or 
implicitly attributed to the deed by those who sent them.
The question of a feminist agenda is a thread that runs throughout the articles 
below, which deal with women suicide bombers in three conflict arenas: the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the Russian-Chechen conflict, and the Sri Lankan-Tamil conflict. 
The collection of articles was launched following a seminar at the Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies in May 2005, “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?” Some 
of the articles are based on the authors’ presentations at the seminar.
Palestinian female suicide bombers are the subject of the first four articles. Not 
only do they command the interest of analysts in this part of the world, but Israel’s 
media openness has allowed interviews with many unsuccessful women bombers, 
which provides a unique channel of information. In the opening article, Mira Tzoreff 
studies the phenomenon of suicide bombing within the context of the Palestinian 
social  agenda,  and  suggests  that  suicide  bombing  may  represent  a  distorted 
effort by women who differed from the normative Palestinian woman to achieve 
a legitimate status of their own. In the second article, Yoram Schweitzer cautions 
against relying on one-time media exposure or quick and short interviews, where 
packaged answers are spouted by prepared interviewees.  Based on his interviews 
with several dozen jailed women, Schweitzer also argues that while feminist mantras 
were chanted loudly and proudly after each event by external supporters, they were 
hardly evident from the beginning. Thus at issue here is the questionable presence of 
authentic feminist motives, as well as the effort by both the Western press and by the 
Arab media to use these women as tools for the purposes of their own propaganda. 12    Introduction
This divide between Western and Arab portraits of the women and their feminist 
contribution is documented by Avi Issacharoff. And yet, as Rivka Yadlin shows in 
the fourth article, what constitutes feminism is in itself open to cultural debate, with 
many Muslim women rejecting the Western feminist recipe and choosing their own 
version of feminist expression.
The three other articles in this monograph explore additional aspects within 
the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova 
study the Black Widows, the suicide bombers who have earned a prominent, albeit 
hierarchically subordinate, role in Chechnya’s terrorism campaign. The fact that their 
conflict is primarily a nationalist one, rather than a religious one, has certain policy 
ramifications. In his article on Tamil women suicide bombers, Arjuna Gunawardena 
suggests that once having become combatants the female Black Tigers are already 
emancipated to a certain extent, and therefore do not need to die to achieve equality 
in this respect. However, the women’s role in the Tamili national struggle has not 
bequeathed them with a higher status in the Tamili society. In the final article, Maria 
Alvanou urges the study of female suicide terrorism through the lens of criminology, 
which can join gender studies and yield important insight on this phenomenon.
According to conventional wisdom, women as the bearers and nurturers of life 
lack the natural inclination to carry out violent acts resulting in death. Recent decades 
have proven that under certain circumstances women can behave and fight in as 
deadly a fashion as their male counterparts. Whether driven by society, exploited by 
organizations, or obeying or defying patriarchal norms, the fact remains they are no 
longer only the mothers of those who dare to give up life killing others; now some, 
and not even in marginal numbers only, have become emissaries of death.
Notes
1  Based on the definition in Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, The Globalization of Terror: 
The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the International Community (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 154-55.
2  Interview by Yoram Schweitzer with A.M., October 26, 2005.The Palestinian Shahida: 
National Patriotism, Islamic Feminism, 
or Social Crisis
Mira Tzoreff
Is it purely by chance that the phenomenon of Palestinian female suicide bombers 
occurred only during the height of the second intifada and not at all during the 
first one? In order to answer this question, two main factors must be considered: 
developments within the Palestinian national-political arena and gender phenomena 
in Palestinian society. 
It is generally understood that the appearance of the women suicide bombers 
(shahidat)  cannot  be  separated  from  the  internal  national-political  developments 
within the Palestinian public during the nearly thirteen years between the outbreak 
of the first intifada in December 1987 and the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada in 
October 2000. However, the most significant period in this respect was actually the 
seven or eight intervening years, bordered by the end of the first intifada in 1992 
and the year preceding the onset of the al-Aqsa intifada in October 2000 – years 
marked by the evaluation of successes and failures, and of deep moral stocktaking. 
As to gender-related developments, there are strong claims that the appearance of 
Palestinian shahidat is but one element in the broader spectrum of gender phenomena 
evident within Palestinian society, both during the intifadas and between them.
At the beginning of the first intifada, the leadership of the Palestinian national 
movement called upon Palestinian women to take an active part in the national 
struggle. However, rather than allowing the women to choose how to serve their 
nation, it urged them to fulfill particular goals – goals that were part and parcel of 
their gender. One of the obvious duties laid upon them was to become “mothers of 
the nation.” In one of the intifada leadership’s flyers, Palestinian mothers, sisters, 
and daughters are described as Palestinian manabit – plant nurseries1 – or as men-
producing factories, and the woman’s womb, now “nationalized,” so to speak, was 14    Mira Tzoreff
termed a batn askari – a “military womb.”2 Article 17 of the Hamas charter, published 
on August 18, 1988, echoes the sentiment: “The Muslim woman has a role in the 
struggle for liberation that does not fall from that of the man in that she is the one 
who produces the men.”
Thus, in the framework of the national discourse, women’s contribution to the 
Palestinian cause was measured by their degree of productivity, in its purest and most 
basic meaning of re-productivity. This discourse, which turned Palestinian women’s 
fertility into a nationalist patriotic subject in every way, recycled a similar refrain 
that had been common in Palestinian newspapers during the 1930s, and especially 
during the years of the Arab rebellion of 1936–39. At that time it was claimed, inter 
alia, that “the woman who rocks the baby’s cradle with one hand, rocks the nation 
with the other.”3 Conversely, the woman who refrains from bearing children harms 
the nation. Not only did this discourse nationalize the body of every Palestinian 
woman; it also unequivocally ascribed her place to within the private domain of the 
home. It predetermined the continuation of her traditional duties of giving birth to, 
caring for, and educating children, and in doing so, excluded her from what was 
considered the loftiest possible contribution to the national struggle: participation in 
military activities against the enemy, which sometimes ended in the sacrifice of one’s 
life. The danger that she might be killed is inherent in the participation in military 
actions, and her womb would then no longer be able to serve the nation’s need. 
Indeed, the climax of the process of nationalizing motherhood in the first intifada 
was the bestowal of the exalted status of “Mother of a Shahid” upon the Palestinian 
woman. Whereas their own self-sacrifice was categorically prescribed for them via 
common Palestinian rhetoric, Palestinian mothers were urged to sacrifice their sons 
willingly. Moreover, they were expected to do so with equanimity and even with 
joy. This demand changed Palestinian motherhood into “other mothering.” Official 
flyers declared: “We salute the Mother of the Shahid and we stand at attention to 
the sound of the joyful ululation (zaghalit) emitted from her mouth, which she will 
ululate twice: once on the day that her son leaves to fight and to fall and become a 
shahid, and the day on which the [Palestinian] state will be declared.”4 The joyful 
ululation to be voiced by the mothers of shahids during their funerals symbolized 
the public sanction of the link between mother-son/shahid and the nation-to-be. The 
Hamas movement, which wanted to turn this into political capital and Islamicize the 
intifada according to its goals and needs, created an uncompromising link between 
the norms of feminine modesty (’ard) and the honor (ard) of the national shahids. This 
was the call for women to cover their heads with a scarf, tahajabi.5 Hamas chose the The Palestinian Shahida    15
tahajabi as a sign of identification with the sanctified dead sons, and it quickly became 
a norm, mainly in the Gaza Strip where Hamas was a more dominant force.
The  negative  imbalance  of  the  uprising  for  the  Palestinians  became  obvious 
even during the height of the first intifada, especially after Yasir Arafat sided with 
Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War, as a result of which the Palestinians lost the 
support of the international community. This intifada saw an increase in the number 
of those killed, injured, imprisoned, and expelled, a greater number of Palestinian 
homes demolished, and a further decline of the economic situation in the occupied 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.  The  general  disillusionment  escalated  following  the 
Oslo accords (September 1993) and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
six months later; there was also more and more violence among the Palestinian 
populace, more frequent closures of schools, and greater limitations in freedom of 
movement.
There  were  several  causes  for  this  disillusionment,  including  revelations  of 
corruption within the Palestinian Authority’s leadership. There were also growing 
realizations  that  this  leadership  had  failed  to  establish  either  the  institutions 
necessary for the imminent Palestinian state or the infrastructures for education, 
health, and welfare services, or even workplaces that would relieve the Palestinians’ 
dependence on Israel for jobs. All of these, separately and together, ate away at the 
feeling of solidarity and led to the erosion of the readiness among Palestinian women 
to adhere to the tasks designed for them by their leadership. This was expressed in 
1995 by Suha Barghouti of the Institute of Women Studies at Birzeit University in the 
following way:
In the past, sectarian divisions prevailed amongst us . . . nevertheless, 
we had many common denominators because of our clear-cut attitude 
regarding the struggle against the occupation. At present, our shared 
political and national interests have decreased significantly and the 
situation that has been created is one of deadlock and controversy.6
The climax of the situation described above found its expression in the al-Aqsa 
intifada, which lacked the widespread enthusiasm and support of the first one: it 
had been forced upon the populace in order to divert attention from the failures of 
the first intifada and to plant new hopes within the general public.
Along  with  the  differences  in  the  situation  that  prevailed  in  October  2000 
compared to that of 1992, there was the concomitant steady (if slow) decline in the 
readiness of Palestinian women to bear the full weight of the national goals imposed 
upon  them.  The  agenda  of  this  intifada  thus  included  three  characteristics  that 16    Mira Tzoreff
differed from those of the first one: a gender-oriented (feminist) social agenda as 
an alternative to the national agenda of the hegemonic male-dominated leadership; 
an alternative motherhood, along with the previous recruited national motherhood; 
and the phenomenon of women suicide bombers (shahidat).
The first signs of gender discourse had already begun to appear in 1992. The 
women who took part in it were adamant in bringing discussions regarding gender 
and social issues to the forefront of the national discourse, even at the cost of outright 
confrontation with the Palestinian leadership – which preferred to marginalize any 
discussion of social issues, including those regarding women. As far as elevating 
the  national  struggle  above  the  social  one,  the  women’s  earlier  forgiving  tone 
was  replaced  by  a  still  apologetic  but  now  defiant  and  even  challenging  one. 
Representative of this is an article written by Ilham abu Ghazalla, also of Birzeit 
University, which appeared on November 1, 1992 in the Jerusalem-based newspaper 
al-Quds. The title of the article was “al-Maraah wal-Watan Yakun Takun,” translated 
here very freely as, “As its women, so too the homeland.” Underlying the article is 
the author’s claim that the national struggle has only a meager chance to succeed 
unless the social struggle is promoted:
Due to the intifada many groups have come to understand that there 
cannot be a successful national struggle without an open-minded and 
creative young generation, [and] without workers free of deprivation. 
Women have also realized that the homeland is not only the ground 
itself, but those that live on it. For how can a person whose society 
oppresses him defend it and his country? Our women have begun to 
realize that family sorrow upon the birth of a girl directly affects the 
life of that girl as she grows up and when she becomes a woman – a 
woman constrained by dictates of attire and social behavior whenever 
she leaves her home: studies, work, social life, reading of books, finding 
a husband – she may not, she can not, initiate anything. And a nation 
half of whose population is shackled – how will it become liberated?7
One notable event in this direction was the August 1994 signing of an accord that 
united all of the women’s organizations that had arisen in the occupied territories as 
of the late 1980s. These included the various centers for women’s issues in Nablus, 
Jerusalem, and Gaza, and the Center for Legal and Social Counseling. The accord 
called for the removal of the obstacles blocking the way for the equalization of the 
status of Palestinian women with that of Palestinian men and was heralded by the 
slogan, “There can be no democracy without women’s representation.”8The Palestinian Shahida    17
An  immediate  step  in  this  direction,  initiated  by  the  women’s  umbrella 
organization,  was  the  establishment  of  a  shadow  parliament  whose  role  was 
to formulate a social and gender-oriented agenda. In a newspaper interview in 
September 1994, upon the occasion of the establishment of this parliament, Eileen 
Kuttab, the head of the Ramallah-based Bisan Center for Research and Development 
of Palestinian Society, stated the following:
The issue of the woman [in Palestinian society] is a purely social issue, 
and the role of non-government organizations is to work together as a 
group to put pressure on the Palestinian Authority to adopt the issue 
of civil rights – as a strategy – but, along with this, these organizations 
must also propel the society forward towards democracy. Our goal is to 
cause a change in the status of women as a guarantee for civil equality. 
And since the Palestinian women’s umbrella organization is a non-
government organization, it should be the one to put this process in 
motion.9
That same year, at the initiative of the Center for Legal Assistance for Women in 
Jerusalem and al-Haq, a Palestinian organization for civil rights, a congress dealing 
with  women,  justice,  and  legislation  was  convened.  At  the  congress  concrete 
demands were made for changes in the personal status law regarding the status 
of women, one of which was to raise the age of marriage for girls to eighteen. (This 
demand was based on statistics gathered by the Center for Women’s Issues in Gaza, 
which indicated that 41.8 percent of the girls in the areas of the Palestinian Authority 
were between the ages of 12–17 when they were married.) Other demands included 
repealing the laws allowing talaq divorce (unilateral repudiation of a wife by her 
husband) and the concomitant transfer of the divorce procedure to the civil courts, 
and the cessation of polygamy.10
These  organizations  were  not  content  with  sterile  theoretical  discussions  for 
changes at some indefinite future time, but were active in the field, where they offered 
women advice in such matters as family planning, childrearing, and integration 
in the workforce. The Islamic organizations did not allow this to go on without 
responses of their own, and within one year (1997–98) two organizations of Islamic 
women appeared, al-Huda and al-Khansa, each of which presented a platform that 
shaped the secular feminists’ gender demands according to the commandments and 
laws of Islam.11
The peak of this process was reflected by an outpouring of women’s achievements 
in cultural matters, this in the heat of the most critical period of the al-Aqsa intifada. 18    Mira Tzoreff
For example, in October 2002, at the initiative of Fikra, a Gaza cultural association, an 
original play al-Sayyd Perfect (”Mister Perfect”) was staged and performed in Gaza 
City. The play, written by the twenty-nine year old Palestinian playwright ‘Aatef 
Abu Sayf, deals with the phenomenon of violence in all of its forms in Palestinian 
society, but especially with the status of divorced women and society’s attitude to 
them. Engagement in the knotty question of divorced women reflects a real crisis that 
Palestinian society was undergoing, a crisis borne out by data presented by Mona 
al-Shawa, the head of the Center for Civil Rights in the city of Gaza. For example, in 
2001, when 1427 couples ended their relationships with divorce, most of the women 
were unable to bring their cases before the shari’a courts because they could not 
afford the financial cost of arguing for their legal rights as divorcees, among them 
to be awarded custody of their children. The play crossed virtually all possible red 
lines: from the very matter of the discussion of so sensitive a subject during the 
political whirlwind in which Palestinian society and its leadership were swept up; 
through  the  prominent  dominance  of  the  fundamentalist  Islamic  movements  in 
the Gaza Strip; through the fact that the cast of the play were all women, this in a 
patriarchal society in which such a vocation, or even avocation, is considered taboo; 
and, finally, that the target audience of the play were high school students – “boys 
and girls in whom the play would awaken doubts,” and preferably sooner than later, 
according to the playwright:
I do not believe that we must wait for the end of the occupation; on the 
contrary, we have to discuss internal-social issues – for such discussion 
is necessary for the continued existence of our society. The occupation 
is no more than an excuse to postpone such a discussion to a later stage, 
if at all.12
The second gender phenomenon witnessed during the al-Aqsa intifada was the 
flourishing of a different kind of motherhood than the earlier “mobilized motherhood.” 
During this uprising, Palestinian mothers expressed their fierce opposition to losing 
their sons for the sake of the homeland, even if the deaths turned the sons into shahids 
and themselves into Mothers of Shahids. They wanted their sons alive, and at their 
sides. They expressed their feelings in a series of interviews that were reported in the 
London-based weekly newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat of December 28, 2000. The voices 
of the mother of Isma’il, the mother of Samir, and the mother of Maher themselves 
were heard, and not the voices of designated spokesmen. The interviewed women 
came from all strata of the population; some were well-educated and spoke fluently 
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and lacking. However, there was one common denominator: a perception of self as 
the birth-mother of her own, biological son, in which capacity she – the birth-mother 
– would do anything to protect her son from becoming a shahid. Mothers who failed 
in this renounced the title Mother of the Shahid and declared themselves “bereaved 
mothers” (thukal’a). In this vein, grief and mourning gradually replaced the mother 
of the shahid’s publicly expressed joy: “If only I was a mother, simply a mother and 
not the Mother of the Shahid,”13 or, “I wanted to be a mother that no one knows, 
an anonymous (nakira) mother.”14 Support groups for mothers suffering from the 
trauma of having lost a son began to be active during the second intifada, and this 
allowed women to express their grief despite the patriarchal proscription that tried 
to stifle this sentiment: “I was forbidden to kiss him and to weep over him; the 
sheikh told me that my tears would cause him pain and defile him.”15 Most of the 
women expressed their longing to see their sons: “I couldn’t sleep during the entire 
past month. Today I visited his grave and I called out to him, ‘Arise, awaken, son; 
don’t remain there buried under the earth.’” Or, “I don’t want a son who is a hero; I 
want my son back again. He is mine!”16
The process of the privatization of motherhood was accompanied by trenchant 
criticism of the Palestinian leaders who, while exhorting the sacrifice of the nation’s 
sons, did their utmost to keep their own sons safe from all and any dangers. “Is the 
Palestinian Authority aware of the pain and suffering I am going through? Does any 
one of them realize what it means for a mother to sleep in her bed while her son is 
buried under stones in an ugly graveyard?”17 asked the mother of Riyyad defiantly. 
The voices of these Palestinian mothers thus express the process of privatization, 
from the nationalized motherhood that prevailed and had exhausted itself in the 
first intifada, to individualized motherhood that, step by step, separates itself from 
national responsibility.
The third prominent gender-related dimension to the al-Aqsa intifada was the 
appearance of the shahidat – young women suicide bombers – a phenomenon that 
was glorified but, conversely, also demonized. On January 27, 2002, Wafa Idris blew 
herself up on a main street in Jerusalem. While much has been written explaining 
her deed ideologically, testimony of her friends and family strongly suggests that 
the motivation for her suicide was personal rather than national or religious: Wafa 
Idris was twenty-five years old, divorced by her husband (who was also her cousin) 
after some eight or nine years during which she failed to bring offspring into the 
world. Her status as a divorced and barren woman, and her return as a dependant 
to her parents’ home where she became an economic burden, put her in what is a 20    Mira Tzoreff
dead end situation in a traditional, patriarchal society. She was non-normative in 
Palestinian society and her chances of building a new life for herself were close to 
zero. Wafa Idris’s only way of redeeming herself from the inferior status ordained by 
her surroundings was by choosing to become a shahida for the sake of her nation.
Idris was the pioneer; others followed soon after. In February 2002, Darin Abu 
Issa, a twenty-two year old student from a village near Nablus blew herself up at 
the Maccabim roadblock. Abu Issa, after having been divorced by her husband, 
was a student at al-Najah University in Nablus, where she was a member of the 
Islamic Students Union. According to Palestinian sources, her former husband and 
her brother had both been killed in a clash with Israeli military forces just months 
after her divorce, and this is what motivated her to become a shahida. After Hamas 
rejected her request to carry out a suicide bombing, PLO activists from the Balata 
refugee camp near Nablus granted it.
Hanadi Garedat, a young lawyer from a village in the Jenin area who carried 
out a suicide attack in a crowded restaurant in Haifa in October 2003, represents 
a different sub-group of women suicide bombers. At the age of twenty-seven and 
still unmarried, Garedat was in an untenable position in a society that sanctifies 
marriage. Her non-normative status exposed her to its supervisory apparatus, which 
refused to recognize her as an educated and economically independent woman, and 
continued to scrutinize her every move, especially her sexual behavior. Becoming 
a shahida rescued her from the lifelong spinsterhood dictated by her advanced age. 
Moreover, it bestowed upon her the title “Bride of Haifa,” for as a shahida she has 
been, as it were, married to the soil of Haifa, while prior to this it was only the 
male shahid who in his death wedded the soil of the homeland. This title represents 
the feminization of the national metaphoric conjugal bond: the soil of Haifa is the 
substitute for a flesh and blood husband in Hanadi Garedat’s unrealized marriage.
Women like Idris, Abu Issa, and Garedat were easy targets for recruiters who 
preferred childless divorced or separated young women, or unwed and apparently 
“unbetrothable” women.
Another sub-group comprises much younger women who carried out suicide acts 
after they were seduced by Tanzim activists and, whether or not they had become 
pregnant, whose virtue was suspect. They had violated the norms of honor and 
modesty dictated by their society’s mechanism of supervision – namely, rumor and 
gossip, kalam al-nas. They had lost their own honor and had betrayed that of their 
families – and only by their deaths could the honor of both be regained. Becoming 
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and an upgrading of their own and their families’ social status. Thus, Aayat al-
Ahras, an eighteen year old excellent high school student from the Deheishe refugee 
camp not far from Bethlehem, and Andleeb Takatka, a twenty-one year old student 
at Bethlehem University, both carried out suicide bombings in Jerusalem, the first in 
March 2002, the second the following month. Although through their behavior they 
had defiled their families’ honor (’ard), which could lead only to social death, both 
– by self-sacrifice through suicide, istishhad – escaped the humiliating deaths they 
would otherwise have suffered.
Among the women who attempted to carry out suicide acts but were apprehended 
en route is another set of non-normative women. Such for example was Faiza ‘Amal 
Juma’a, an unmarried thirty-five year old woman from the ‘Askar refugee camp 
near Nablus, who was known as Ahmad. She was one of those called mutarajilla, 
manly-women. “Only God knows whether I am really Faiza, as is written in my 
identity card, or Ahmad, which is who I feel I am.”18 Faiza-Ahmad’s fate was sealed, 
as she herself was well aware: “Who will want to marry someone like me? Have you 
forgotten that I am Ahmad?” Even Faiza’s brother-in-law recognized her predicament 
– “I feel pity for her” – and admitted that her trans-sexuality was exploited by her 
recruiters: “Evil people used her personal problem and sent her to put an end to her 
life.” Women such as Faiza neither have the necessary funds to pay for a sex change 
operation nor, even if they do and have such an operation, will they be accepted 
in their society, in which there is no freedom of choice. She was expected to resign 
herself to her God-given female sexuality, and to live according to it. Unable to do 
this, the only way for Faiza-Ahmad to redress her sin of refusing to do so was by 
death as a shahida.
An intensification of the shahidat phenomenon is represented by the suicide of 
Rim Riashi at the Erez check post, not only as the married mother of two small 
children, but also because of the sanction she received by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. 
Yassin had previously ruled that “in our society there is a tendency among women to 
cleave to Jihad and holy death, but the woman is unique and at this time, we have no 
need of acts of suicide by women; ensuring the nation’s existence is important many 
times over.”19 At the same time, unofficial sources confirmed that he would sanction 
suicide actions by women who had stained their family honor. Indeed, it was not 
long before it became clear that Rim Riashi had requested Yassin’s sanction only 
after her relationship with a lover had, via kalam al-nas (gossip), become a known 
matter. Thus, the act of istishhad was the only way to remove the stain of dishonor 
from both herself and her family.22    Mira Tzoreff
Both the Palestinian national leadership and the Islamic movements’ women 
recruiters  made  cynical  use  of  the  suicides  of  young  Palestinian  women.  The 
former tried to embellish them with a feminist slant by presenting the phenomenon 
as evidence of the trend towards equality insofar as Palestinian patriotism was 
concerned, a subject that permeated the national discourse. Thus, for example, in a 
eulogy at the funeral of Wafa Idris: “The martyrdom of the ‘flower Wafa’ proves that 
all sectors of our people, men and women, side by side, are joined together in the 
war of liberation and in the confrontation with the aggression.”20 A female member 
of the Fatah Revolutionary Council went even further and determined that “Wafa’s 
martyrdom has restored honor to the national role of the Palestinian woman; [she] 
has presented us with one of the most awe-inspiring portrayals in the long struggle 
for national liberation.”21
The Islamic movements adopted a similar claim but dressed the women suicides 
in a cloak of authentic Islamic feminism and claimed that women were permitted to 
take an active part in a jihad. To validate this they brought a hadith (a saying that is not 
in the Qur’an but is attributed to the Prophet Mohammed): “If even one centimeter 
of Muslim soil is conquered, then all are commanded to take part in a jihad: a child 
without his father’s permission, a woman without her husband’s permission, and a 
slave without his owner’s permission.” Basing herself on this hadith, Jamilla Shanti, in 
charge of recruiting women for the Islamic Jihad movement, has claimed that “there 
is no difference between the martyrdom of the Muslim sisters and that of the Muslim 
brothers.”22 We are witnessing a process in which the Islamic term shahid/shahida 
itself is undergoing a process of nationalization and Palestine-ization. And in this 
way, the Islamic “holy war for the sake of Allah” [jihad fi sabil ‘allah] is being turned 
into an Islamic “holy war for the sake of the homeland” [jihad fi sabil al watan].
And yet, neither Islamic rhetoric nor nationalistic eloquence has succeeded to 
date in proving that the phenomenon of istishhad, self-sacrifice in the name of Allah, 
is truly a matter of gender equality. And if the question we are trying to clarify is 
whether the shahidat are dying for equality, the answer is yes, very much so – but 
they are dying to be equal, through the living of their lives and not through the 
sanctification of their deaths. The Palestinian Shahida    23
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Reality vs. Myth
Yoram Schweitzer
On  January  27,  2002,  a  terrorist  bomb  exploded  in  the  handbag  of  Wafa  Idris, 
a woman in her late twenties, on Jaffa Street in Jerusalem. The bomb killed Idris 
herself and an Israeli citizen, and wounded approximately fifty people. Idris, cast 
by the media as the first female Palestinian terrorist, was not intended to kill herself 
with her victims, according to the original plan of those who sent her. For some 
unknown reason, however, the bomb went off unexpectedly.1 Nonetheless, as part of 
the suicide terrorist cult that was greatly strengthened in Palestinian society during 
the al-Aqsa intifada, Idris was crowned a hero throughout the entire Arab world 
and was portrayed as a symbol of the new Muslim feminism. She became famous as 
a noble and heroic expression of the collective desire of Muslim women in general, 
and of Palestinian women in particular, to enlist in the struggle against the enemies 
of the nation of Islam, chief among them Israel.2
The cult fostered by the Arab media around the image of Idris and the expressions 
of identification with her among the Palestinians have created a new model for 
Palestinian girls and women, as well as for Muslim women beyond the theater 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seeking to follow the same path.3 Thus, between 
Wafa Idris’s action in January 2002 and the end of May 2006, sixty-seven Palestinian 
women were counted as planning to carry out suicide attacks (figure 1). Eight of 
the women blew themselves up; of these, five of the women were sent by the Fatah 
organization, two by Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and one by Hamas. The other women 
were arrested at the attacks’ various stages of planning.
Most of the women (58 percent) were unmarried, and many were in their early 
twenties (figure 2). Thirty-nine percent were in the 18-25 age bracket, 16 percent were 
in the 26-35 age bracket, and 11 percent were under eighteen (figure 3). Almost half 
were educated: 22 percent had more than a high school education and 26 percent had 26    Yoram Schweitzer
Figure 1. Female Suicide Terrorists: Organizational Affiliation
Figure 2. Female Suicide Terrorists: Marital Status
a high school education and were qualified for non-skilled labor (figure 4). Others 
were very young women with no high school education or profession.4
The highly emotional parades in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in memory of the 
female suicide terrorists who blew themselves up, together with hymns of praise for 
them in the Arab media, have created the impression in the global media that the 
female suicide terrorists were a band of independent women, fully aware of what they 
were doing, who were trying to take an active and equal part in the armed struggle 
and were fully supported by Palestinian society, as well as elsewhere. The question 
arises whether this one-dimensional image portrayed in the media is grounded in 
fact. Or, does a gap exist between the myth surrounding female Palestinian suicide Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers    27
terrorists and the personal and social reality in which they operated, which may 
have pushed many of them into volunteering for their missions.
The large number of imprisoned female Palestinian suicide terrorists, compared 
with  the  number  under  arrest  in  other  places  around  the  world,  has  created  a 
demand for interviews with them among those wishing to study the motivation of 
female suicide terrorists. Israel’s policy of media openness has acknowledged the 
fascination with the phenomenon of female suicide terrorists and made possible many 
interviews with those who did not complete their missions. These interviews with 
the women themselves have provided a critical dimension beyond the posthumous 
hype surrounding the women who blew themselves up. The interviews have thus 
constituted a key resource for drawing conclusions and attempting to understand 
the global phenomenon of female suicide terrorism. 
I have conducted many personal interviews5 and conversations with Palestinian 
male and female political prisoners, including intended suicide terrorists and those 
who sent them, about their motives and the background to their actions. In the course of 
Figure 3. Female Suicide Terrorists: Breakdown by Age
Figure 4. Female Suicide Terrorists: Education Level28    Yoram Schweitzer
these conversations, their position concerning the involvement of Palestinian women 
in suicide terrorist attacks was examined specifically. In contrast to the enthusiasm 
with which they defended the right and duty of men to volunteer for actions against 
Israel, a decisive majority of the men interviewed by me contended that there was no 
need to employ women as suicide terrorists, and expressed opposition to women’s 
involvement in this type of action. Their opposition was not due to a principled 
moral denial of the religious and national right of women to carry out the action. It 
mostly reflected their fear of possibly degrading of the honor of Palestinian women, 
which as such would be personally damaging to their honor as men. The principal 
anxiety concerning the honor of women lay in the conditions of their imprisonment, 
interrogation by men, body searches, improper language about them and in their 
presence, and so forth. Those interviewed expressed concern about insensitive Israeli 
behavior towards all Palestinian women and lack of proper consideration for their 
honor in the future. It was also asserted that there were enough men to carry out the 
work, and that there was no need for women to do it for them. 
This  dissenting  opinion  is  also  reflected  in  the  stance  of  the  Palestinian 
organizations, which for a long time refrained from employing women as suicide 
terrorists. In the first wave of thirty-eight suicide terrorist attacks by Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad during the Oslo process in 1993-2000, all the perpetrators were men. 
When the al-Aqsa intifada broke out, the organizations’ reservations about sending 
women began to moderate, but the operational change occurred only fifteen months 
after this intifada began. The first to include women in suicide terrorist attacks was 
Fatah in early 2002, followed by Islamic Jihad and finally Hamas, which was “forced 
reluctantly” to surrender to difficult field conditions and individual operational 
considerations in getting through Israeli roadblocks.
 Nasser Shawish6 of Fatah was personally involved in sending three suicide 
terrorists, including a woman named Dareen Abu Aisha. Shawish reiterated during 
all my conversations with him that in principle he opposed sending women, and 
had even continuously tried to persuade Abu Aisha to abandon her determination to 
carry out a suicide mission: “I felt that she was a pretty and successful girl studying 
at the university, a future mother, who should marry and bear children, and help 
her people in other ways. But she wouldn’t stop pressuring me.” With Obeyda, his 
fiancée and Dareen’s best friend, he tried to dissuade Dareen from carrying out the 
suicide attack and thereby protect her. For her part, Dareen threatened Shawish that 
unless he helped her become a shahida, she would buy a knife, go kill soldiers at a 
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case, after his closest friend, Muhanad Abu Haliwa, was killed and, he said, after he 
witnessed the killing of the family of wanted terrorist Nabil Quake in Ramallah when 
they were hit by a missile fired at his car. These events pushed him into surrendering 
to her entreaties. “I looked for vengeance, and I wanted it to be special. Enough! I felt 
that a woman would be able to carry out this special attack that we planned more 
easily, and pass through the roadblocks, because of her innocent appearance.”7
Sharif, a Fatah operative responsible for sending the terrorist who perpetrated 
the attack on the Seafood Market Restaurant in Tel Aviv (which the Palestinians 
consider to be a suicide terrorist attack with light weaponry), said in an interview 
that he had also been asked at some point to send women on suicide missions. He 
said that in principle he had opposed sending women. He commented on both the 
practical side, and the limitations in sending women. He was asked to arrange a safe 
house for women who had volunteered to carry out suicide terrorist attacks, so that 
they would not be seen in public before they were sent. Though he arranged the 
safe house as requested, he did not want to deal with them, because he was afraid 
of what would be said about him as a single man entering an apartment together 
with two women. He was concerned that the good name of his family would also be 
affected, and was particularly anxious about the reactions of the families of the girls, 
who would have held him responsible for sending their daughters.8
Abd al-Raouf Kawasme, a failed Hamas suicide terrorist from a group of soccer 
players on a Hebron team who volunteered as a group to carry out suicide terrorist 
attacks  also  expressed  opposition  to  the  involvement  of  women  in  this  type  of 
activity “because there are enough men who will do it, and this is men’s work. 
Women should concentrate on social and other activity.”9 Indeed, in interviews I 
conducted with Hamas members, they all expressed unequivocal opposition to the 
involvement of women. In support of their view, they said that their organization 
had not sent women as suicide terrorists, except for the case of Rim Riashi, which 
they did not regard as a change in policy by the organization but as a “temporary 
constraint of tough reality on the ground.” A Hamas prisoner from the Gaza Strip 
expressed strong opposition to his organization’s sending of Riashi, a mother of two 
small children. In a moment of candor, he confessed that as asserted by Israel, he 
had heard from trusted sources from his hometown that Riashi had had an affair 
with a senior Hamas operative, and expressed horror that matters had deteriorated 
to the point where people in his organizations were having intimate relations with a 
married woman and sending her to blow herself up.30    Yoram Schweitzer
It should be emphasized that most of those interviewed did not dispute the 
right of any Palestinian to act in defense of his or her people. To them, however, the 
correct way for women to act was different – not through suicide terrorist attacks. 
Interestingly, this included many who opposed sending women on suicide missions 
but nonetheless claimed that they saw no difference in principle between male and 
female suicide terrorists. Some had themselves sent women on such missions. Amjad 
Ubeidi is an Islamic Jihad senior operative responsible for sending Nihadi Jardat on 
October 4, 2004 on an attack against the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, which killed 
twenty-one people and wounded fifty, in revenge for the death of her fiancé and his 
best friend. He claimed that he had tried to persuade her not to go on the mission, 
but that her determination and reasons for carrying it out had convinced him to help 
her.10 In an interview broadcast by al-Jazeera, Ubeidi proclaimed that “in our society, 
the death of a son is much more difficult for the parents than the death of a daughter. 
The grief for the loss of ten daughters will not match the grief of the loss of one boy, 
because his role in society is much greater.”11 In a later interview he clarified his 
statement as referring specifically to a bomber’s family that lost the only son it had, 
with no implication that girls are worth less than boys.  
Muatez Haimouni, who sent Andalib Taqtaqah to the Mahane Yehuda market in 
Jerusalem where she killed six people and wounded dozens more (on April 12, 2004), 
also claimed that in his view, there was no difference between men and women as 
suicide terrorists. He said that the combination of the woman’s determination to 
volunteer for the mission and the urgent operational need to strike against Israelis, 
which for tactical purposes required the use of a woman instead of a man in order 
to bypass obstacles, had convinced him to send her without hesitation. Loyal to his 
purportedly egalitarian stance, Haimouni also recruited an Israeli Arab girl to assist 
in the plot following a friendship/romance they developed over the internet.12
Beyond these observations, special insights are gleaned from the disclosures of 
the women themselves. Presented below are interviews with three female suicide 
terrorists who were caught before they carried out their plans. Two of the women 
were en route to their target, and a third was arrested at home a short time before 
going into action. The three women were young and unmarried, aged twenty to 
twenty-six. They related different and sometimes contradictory versions of their 
motives and the circumstances in which they volunteered for their missions. 
The specific women have been portrayed here because they granted a number 
of interviews at different times, some public and some personal, to various people 
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people  from  the  media,  the  conversations  with  academics  were  conducted  as 
personal conversations and included a number of meetings. Predictably, the media 
interviews were of a more declarative character and were filled with outspokenly 
nationalistic and sometimes also religious messages that they or their organizations 
wished to deliver to viewers and readers. Such messages were not completely absent 
from the personal interviews, but the number, length, and context of the messages 
differed. More personal aspects also emerged in the one-on-one interviews, which 
helped clarify some missing particulars that were obscured by all the nationalist 
pronouncements. These aspects made it clear that their motives were more complex 
than those outwardly declared.
Most prominent was the women’s contradictory versions of their stories, and 
the general effect that collective time with fellow political prisoners had on their 
autobiographies.  This  aspect  emerged  especially  in  the  personal  interviews  but 
in some of the media interviews as well, conducted in the earlier stages of their 
imprisonment, before they were briefed by their domineering cellmates. In these 
personal interviews, the women expressed a strong feeling that their difficult personal 
situation had been exploited to lead them to volunteer for their mission, without 
their having fully thought through the deed they planned to commit. In contrast, 
personal remarks were generally absent from the media interviews conducted with 
them after they had already spent time in prison. The latter interviews were primarily 
products of an indoctrination process, formal or informal, in prison. They bore a 
dominant nationalistic character, and reflected the uniform dogmatic messages that 
the organizations wished to deliver.
Thouria Khamour 
Thouria Khamour, born in 1976, lived in Jba in the Jenin area. She was arrested on 
May 19, 2002, one day before she planned to leave to carry out a suicide terrorist 
attack in Jerusalem. She was arrested at home, before embarking on the mission she 
had volunteered for two weeks previously.
Thouria was interviewed a number of times in 2002-4. In these interviews, she 
gave different versions of her motives and the way she was recruited for her mission. 
As more time passed in prison, she changed her description of the circumstances 
under which she volunteered and the motives she declared. She recast herself from 
a girl whose personal motives dominated to a flag bearer for the Palestinian and 
Islamic national struggle against the Zionist enemy.32    Yoram Schweitzer
The first interview took place ten days after her arrest. She said that she had 
volunteered  for  the  mission  out  of  personal  motives,  explaining,  “sometimes 
a person is subject to such great pressure and mental distress that it leads to an 
explosion.” Thouria said that she had volunteered for the operation mostly because 
of rejection by society and her family’s objections to a man who wished to marry 
her. She claimed that she had in any case never intended to carry out the mission. 
“I regretted it,” she said, and gave three reasons for her decision that she would not 
act. “I began to think that I was killing people, babies, women, and sick people, and 
to imagine my family sitting in a restaurant, and someone blowing them up,” she 
explained. As another reason, she said that she feared “that God would not regard it 
(her personal circumstances) as a worthy motive, and would therefore not consider 
her a shahida.” The most significant reason she gave, however, was the order that her 
handlers gave her that she must blow herself up in any event, even if it was not in 
the middle of a mass of people. “I felt that they were trading in the blood of shahids,” 
she stated.13
In other conversations in prison with an academic researcher, Thouria talked 
about the personal problems that had led her to take her life into her hands. “I was 
25 years old, unmarried, and my situation at home wasn’t good. At age seventeen, I 
already tried to harm myself twice, but they stopped me.”14 According to her account, 
at age twenty, after looking for personal and social fulfillment, and after her parents 
rebuked her for the way she dressed and her tomboyish behavior and warned her 
that she would be unable to find a husband, “I started returning to religion, wearing 
traditional clothing, and behaving like a girl. I very much wanted to get married.”15
She stayed in school only until the tenth grade. She was a mediocre student, and 
did not continue her studies. She went to work, but did not apply herself there and 
changed jobs several times. Due to her unstable way of life, her family considered 
her a weak and difficult person who should be watched carefully so that she would 
not dishonor her family. When she finally found a prospective groom to share a 
new life with her, a man who was disabled, and the two agreed to marry, her family 
strongly opposed the match because of his disability and because of a disagreement 
over the price that the groom’s family would have to pay to her father. As a result, 
the marriage was called off. Thouria related that the young man had been her only 
chance of getting married, which her father had destroyed, and that she had therefore 
decided to take revenge on him by becoming a shahida.  From this point, the road 
to her assignment to a suicide mission was short. She met with a young man she 
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was interrupted with her arrest by the Israeli security forces upon their receipt of 
intelligence information. “The minute I decided to become a suicide terrorist, I knew 
that I had to do it. Perhaps then my father would have understood me… they used 
me… I’m so sorry.”16
In a later interview granted to Maariv magazine in September 2004, after spending 
a long time in prison with her cellmates, a more belligerent Thouria appeared, telling 
a completely different and altruistic story, with no trace of personal motives. She 
said that the main theme of her life was the struggle against Israeli occupation. She 
declared that she had volunteered for her mission
because I wanted to become a shahida and sacrifice myself for Palestine 
by killing many Jews… I calculated how many Jews I should kill for it 
to be considered a success, and for it to be worth my death. How many? 
As many as possible – wherever there was a crowd… I closed my eyes, 
and dreamed of injuring more than 100 or 200 Jews. A large number. 
I thought only of that. To sacrifice myself, and that hundreds of Jews 
would die. 
She later explained that although as a Muslim she knew that there were four acts 
forbidden by her religion (uproot a tree, kill a child, kill an old person, and kill a 
woman),
the Jewish baby who would have died in the attack would become a 
soldier tomorrow, and would do what your soldiers are doing now. He 
would murder Palestinians and occupy Palestine, so I felt comfortable 
with the decision I finally made, that I was going to do something good 
for the fatherland. It wasn’t something I did spontaneously; it came 
after long thought. I was proud of myself, because it required a lot of 
willpower. It wasn’t easy to make such a decision, but my faith in God 
and my love for Palestine and Jerusalem helped me.
She finished on a selfless, socially conscious note: “I asked that if I succeeded in 
carrying out my mission, my reward would go to Palestinian orphans. I wanted to 
sacrifice myself for my country and God.”17
In  an  interview  that  she  granted  to  the  German  newspaper  Der  Spiegel  in 
September 2004, Thouria portrayed herself as a fearless warrior who initiated the 
terrorist attack and collected intelligence for it before joining the Tanzim members 
who planned to send her on the mission. She said that she had turned to them only 
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family who had educated her “to oppose the occupation,” and to the humiliation 
that her father had undergone at the hands of the Israeli army. Thouria described 
the  preparations  for  the  missions,  which  amounted  to  a  conversation  in  which 
her seriousness was evaluated, and forty-five minutes of instruction about how to 
activate the bomb in the bag that she was to have carried. She said, “I began to feel 
close to the Garden of Eden, and that the belt with which I had practiced [before she 
was given the bomb-filled bag] had become part of my body.” Later in the interview 
she said that her forthcoming marriage had been deliberately calculated because she 
had wanted to mislead the Israelis and not be suspected by them, as somebody who 
is engaged doesn’t volunteer for this kind of operation.
Thouria’s interviews demonstrate in an extreme way the phenomenon of female 
suicide terrorists undergoing indoctrination in prison. During their imprisonment, 
they construct, accept, or adapt the national and religious narrative, and shape their 
story to explain their motives for volunteering for their missions. Sometimes, they go 
from personal explanations for suicide terrorism to adopting national and religious 
explanations, full of altruism and heroism against a demonized enemy, whose deeds 
justify every kind of action, including indiscriminate murder of innocent people.
Arin Ahmad
Arin Ahmad, unmarried and a resident of Beit Sakhour, was arrested on the way to 
a suicide terrorist attack in Rishon LeZion in 2002, when she was twenty years old. 
Arin volunteered to take part in a double suicide terrorist attack in Rishon LeZion, 
but at the last minute, when she was near the target, she decided that she did not 
want to carry it out. She returned to her handlers and demanded that they bring 
her back to her home, despite efforts by the person who brought her to the scene to 
persuade her to persist in her mission. Another person sent with her on the same 
suicide mission blew himself up. Arin said that he too had regretted taking on the 
mission, and had returned to the man who accompanied them to their target. In 
contrast to her, however, he was eventually persuaded to complete the mission. 
The first formal report in which Arin told about her action took place during a 
visit to the prison by then-Minister of Defense Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who asked to 
meet suicide terrorists who had survived in order to understand their motives. In 
a conversation with him, Arin expressed her concern about what was in store for 
her, following what she termed “a momentary fall.” She claimed in her defense that 
she had retracted her intention in the moment of truth.18 In answer to the minister’s 
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had been religiously motivated, she said that her motive was personal. The Israelis 
had killed the man who had been her boyfriend for a year and a half. “I was in 
distress, and I was depressed,” she said.19 When asked what she wanted to happen 
and whether she had wanted to kill Jews in order to avenge the death of her boyfriend, 
she answered, “I don’t know what I wanted. I was hurt and angry. I have many friends 
from the university who are active in Fatah Tanzim. We sat together one evening, 
and they talked about how they wanted to organize revenge for the operations that 
Israelis were carrying out in the territories. I sat and listened in silence, and thought 
about Jad, my boyfriend, and I suddenly told them, ‘You know what? I’m going to 
carry out a suicide terrorist attack, and that’s that.’ A minute before that, I hadn’t 
thought of such a thing.”20 Arin assumed that the process of volunteering would 
take a long time, during which they would gradually prepare her for the mission. 
Instead, however, the process moved ahead at a dizzying pace. After only four days, 
they called her up, blessed her, and told her that the organization had approved 
sending her on the mission. “They didn’t give me enough time to think about what 
was happening. They pushed and encouraged me. I did everything they told me,” 
she said. When she was asked about what her action would do to her family, she 
answered that she didn’t think about them, but rather about her boyfriend.21
In a number of personal interviews that I conducted with Arin in prison in early 
2005, she came across as an articulate educated young woman with very strong 
opinions. Like many suicide terrorists whom I interviewed in prison, she did not 
refrain from describing the plight of the Palestinians, and asserted that Israel bore 
exclusive responsibility for their volunteering for suicide missions. Arin strongly 
opposed the claim that the main trigger for her volunteering for the mission had 
been the death of her boyfriend. When I told her that I had understood this from 
what I had read in her interviews and what I heard veiled in her words, she stated,
The goal of my going on the mission was not vengeance; it was to 
deliver a message to people in Israel to stop the occupation, and to 
make them feel the pain that the Palestinians felt. We tried to stop our 
suffering many times, in various ways, but no one listened to us. As a 
Palestinian girl, how can I stop the suffering if my home is constantly 
under occupation, and there are tanks surrounding my home, while 
everyone in the world is enjoying music, and the only melody I can 
hear is the sound of bullets. Had I carried out my mission, I would have 
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Israelis who voted for Sharon are to blame for the situation that has 
been created.
She explained the reason why she had backed out by saying, “I eventually realized 
that both I and the Israelis I would be killing were human beings, that I had no 
right to take their lives, and that God would be angry at me if I assumed this right 
myself.”22 
In these conversations, Arin was hesitant to say explicitly that her handlers had 
exploited her unhappy personal situation to lead her to go through with her slip of 
the tongue and send her to her death. When I told her that our conversations had 
made this as clear as daylight to me, she smiled in assent, and said that when she 
got out, she would have something to say to several people.23 Arin expressed anger 
at those who had sent her for not honoring her decision to avoid killing women and 
children, and especially for trying to persuade her to retract her decision not to carry 
out the suicide attack, and later trying to send her on another terrorist mission. In 
my conversations with the handler who had been responsible for sending her on 
the mission, he denied that he had tried to persuade her to go on another mission.24 
This denial was echoed by the person who drove her to and from the site of the 
operation.25 
Arin is one of a relatively rare type of suicide terrorist (female and male): those 
who changed their minds after reaching their target, because they decided, out of 
moral principle, not to kill innocent people. In conversation, Arin gave an impression 
of credibility, maturity, and articulateness, which are not typical characteristics of 
suicide terrorists. In her interviews, she took care to project a tough nationalistic line, 
which she regarded as completely justified. Yet there were nonetheless elements of 
uncertainty and questioning. Although she refrained from explicitly condemning 
suicide  terrorist  operations  and  linked  the  rationale  for  them  to  the  prevailing 
military and political situation in the region, she ended one of her interviews with 
the rhetorical question, addressed mostly to herself, “How can I condemn suicide 
terrorist attacks when I myself went on such a mission?”
Wafa al-Bas
On the morning of June 20, 2005, Wafa Samir Ibrahim al-Bas, aged twenty-one, a 
resident of the Jabalya refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip, came to the Erez 
roadblock with ten kilograms of explosives hidden in her underclothes. She was 
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herself up. Al-Bas had been badly burned in an accident in late 2004 when a heater 
in her family’s home exploded, seriously injuring her. She was treated at the Soroka 
Medical Center. Seizing this opportunity, the people who sent her attempted to 
have her carry out a suicide terrorist attack at the hospital where she had a medical 
checkup scheduled.
The Erez roadblock is located on the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel. 
When al-Bas neared the place where security checks were conducted, she aroused the 
suspicion of the Israeli security forces. Realizing that her plan had been discovered, 
she unsuccessfully tried a number of times to activate the explosive device on her 
person. After the explosives were neutralized, she was arrested and brought for 
questioning
Shortly after, the print and broadcast media were allowed to conduct interviews 
with al-Bas. In contrast to the two cases discussed above, all the interviews with her 
were conducted during a single day, before she was brought to the prison facility 
with her compatriots and before she underwent any process of indoctrination and 
preparation for interviews. In contrast to her compatriots, who were more personal 
in  their  initial  interviews,  al-Bas’s  initial  interviews  were  of  a  demonstratively 
belligerent nationalistic character. She presented an inflexible and uncompromising 
stance regarding her motives and the reason that she had enlisted for her mission. 
Only in later interviews on the same day, when her demonstrative single-mindedness 
begin to dissipate, did she express her realization that her handlers had exploited 
her disability and resulting poor mental state.
The  contrast  between  interviews  was  stark.  In  her  initial  interviews,  al-Bas 
declared, “I wanted to kill forty to fifty Israelis. I didn’t care whether children would 
be among them. Our children also died. I had no personal reasons. All my motives 
were nationalistic, coming from my heart and stemming from my beliefs. I believe 
in death. This is a privilege for us, especially death in the way of Allah. I’m also a 
victim of my country. I’m willing to sacrifice myself a thousand times.”26 In another 
interview, she said that ever since she had been a small child, she had wanted to die 
for Allah, and that her dream had been, and still remained, to be a shahida, and to die 
for Allah. “I enlisted from nationalistic and religious motives in order to defend the 
people and the land, and for no other reason…I’m a daughter of al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades, and I wanted to carry out a suicide mission in order to participate in the 
freedom struggle.”27 At this point, she still denied that her volunteering had been 
connected with her difficult external appearance caused by the many burns and scars 
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from my beliefs. I believe in death. This is a privilege for us, especially death in the 
way of God. I’m also a sacrifice of my country, and I’m willing to sacrifice myself a 
thousand times.”28
In later media interviews, however, she claimed that the explosives had been 
planted on her without her knowledge, when she was under the influence of drugs 
in a Palestinian hospital. In one interview, she even burst into tears and wailed, 
“Yesterday, I was free. I remember how I was yesterday, and I see how I am today.” 
In this interview, it seemed that she had suddenly been struck by the recognition 
that those who sent her may have exploited her: “Forgive me, Mother, I wish I hadn’t 
done this to myself, I wish I had listened to you.” At the end of the interview, al-Bas 
said that her parents, who had known about her intention, had attributed her deed 
to her fears that she would be a burden to her family and that her death would help 
them through the financial compensation that they would receive from Fatah.29
Some time later, I saw Wafa for a short while in prison but was not allowed by 
her protective associates to converse with her, under the claim that she was still in 
a difficult emotional state. Still, we exchanged a few words when she entered a cell 
where I was interviewing her friends. She seemed quite happy, smiled, and greeted 
me, and I told her that I was glad to see her alive. Later one of her fellow inmates 
confided that she had pressed Wafa about her recruitment and especially, why she 
tried to blow herself in the Erez zone after she was quarantined, even though it 
was obvious she couldn’t hurt any Israeli. Wafa confessed that she was solicited 
by her friend – the sister of the dispatcher – to volunteer. She agreed, but when she 
subsequently had second thoughts, she was threatened so that she would fulfill her 
mission. Her senders told her to blow herself up even if she was spotted by the 
Israelis and she attempted to do so because this was the order; in other words, she 
followed the orders out of her overwhelming fear.30
The many versions given by al-Bas to the media during a brief period represented 
the typical fluctuating and contradictory versions of their motives given by female 
suicide terrorists. In this case, she went within a short period of time from stressing 
declared ideological nationalistic motives to a public pondering of her personal 
motives that had been cultivated and exploited by those who sent her. Her transition 
from belligerent nationalistic statements and predominantly religious arguments to 
a realization that her handlers had taken advantage of her by encouraging her fears 
regarding her social disability and unfortunate physical and cosmetic state to recruit 
her for a deed that would bestow national fame on her and economic benefit to 
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during her imprisonment (she was sentenced to fourteen years in prison), she will 
undergo an indoctrination process by her cellmates that will lead her too to present 
once again a nationalistic and religious version to the media as her sole motive for 
volunteering for her mission.
Conclusion
The  involvement  of  women  in  suicide  terrorist  attacks  carried  out  by  various 
organizations  around  the  world  is  an  established  fact.  At  the  same  time,  even 
though women are an integral part of the phenomenon, their numbers are still small, 
compared with the number of male suicide terrorists, and their role in the suicide 
terrorist apparatus is limited. They do not manage the organizations, hold command 
positions, or send other people on suicide terrorist missions. Among the Palestinian 
organizations, the status of female suicide terrorists does not differ from those of their 
counterparts around the world. The female Palestinian suicide terrorists do not take 
part in the decision making process in their organizations, and their opinions are not 
the determining factor even in the suicide missions on which they are sent, except 
for their volunteering or expressing agreement to take part in these missions.
The  media  image  of  the  female  Palestinian  suicide  terrorists  as  independent 
women with strong opinions and a key role in the process that led them to their 
deaths in the service of a national or religious ideal fades away when sincere personal 
conversations are held with them. This feeling is reinforced by conversations with 
male suicide terrorists, and particularly with those who sent the women on their 
missions and say that the use of women in suicide missions is a matter of tactical 
necessity, dictated mainly by operational difficulties.  In the absence of these factors, 
they would have avoided including women in this type of action, which is not 
accepted in the conservative societies in which they operate. They admit that, to 
a great extent, Palestinian society continues to embrace the traditional image of 
women as responsible for educational and social functions, or at most helpers of 
male warriors – definitely not leaders of divisions into battle, or fighters sacrificing 
their lives on their own.
In  the  many  interviews  granted  by  female  suicide  terrorists  to  the  various 
media, some of which were conducted after they underwent indoctrination by their 
cellmates, they indicated that they regarded themselves as fulfilling the function of 
publicizing nationalistic messages. This theme often comes in stark contradiction to 
the personal interviews that they granted soon after their arrest. They explained their 
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their people. Particularly in the Arab media, they are thus marketed as independent 
and determined women with strongly held opinions, who decided to take their fate 
into their hands with a feeling of completeness and destiny – rather like a modern 
version of Joan of Arc. They are portrayed as having special, noble personal qualities, 
and are also used to motivate men to follow their example. Yet more thorough 
probing  and  examination  of  the  interviews  with  the  female  Palestinian  suicide 
terrorists, which to a large extent has defined the image of female suicide terrorists 
around the world, is likely to paint a more complete, complex picture of reality.
Accordingly, a more critical reading of what the female suicide terrorists have 
said and an examination of the changes in their interviews over time is warranted. 
Particular attention should be paid to the time when the interview was conducted, 
relative to the date when the person interviewed was arrested. The reader should 
be aware of the process of socialization and organizational and national conformity 
reflected in many of the later interviews. The statements as to their motivation to be 
a martyr, made by both Palestinian and other female suicide bombers worldwide, 
may reflect their authentic need to take part in fighting against their people’s enemy, 
but it does not in any way change their unequal and inferior social status as well as 
the reluctance of their traditional societies to include women in these operations.
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 The Palestinian and Israeli Media 
on Female Suicide Terrorists
Avi Issacharoff
Female  suicide  terrorists  have  consistently  attracted  abundant  media  attention. 
Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  the  Israeli  and Arab  (mostly  Palestinian)  media  have 
peddled  competing  versions  of  reality.  In  a  certain  sense,  the  Israeli  version  of 
reality perpetuates the chauvinism in Arab Islamic society, and portrays the female 
Palestinian suicide terrorist in a relatively sympathetic light, compared with the male 
suicide terrorist. This narrative portrays her as weak and subject to manipulation by 
a chauvinist society. As such, it focuses on personal and social aspects, and ignores 
nationalist  motives.  The Arab  media,  on  the  other  hand,  develops  the  feminist 
dimension, portraying the Palestinian female suicide terrorist as a full partner in the 
national and religious jihad, while downplaying personal aspects.
The Israeli media likes female suicide terrorists; it takes a greater interest in female 
terrorists than male terrorists. The Israeli press admires and flatters female terrorists, 
demonstrates excessive empathy for their deeds, and hangs on every piquant detail 
and gossip about these women. It describes them as women with difficult social 
backgrounds who come from the margins of Palestinian society and have problems 
at home, mostly relating to their family situation. The question arises, of course, 
whether they are very different from male suicide terrorists, and the answer is that 
they are not particularly different. Male suicide terrorists also usually come from 
the margins of Palestinian society, and have various personal problems that make it 
easier to recruit them for suicide terrorism. In the case of men, however, the media 
mostly comments on the revenge motive – family members of the terrorist who were 
killed – or his difficult economic background, hinting that the male terrorist had 
nothing to lose. A male terrorist will not receive the same empathy and interest as 
a female suicide terrorist, about whom the question always arises whether she had 
a romantic affair, divorce, personal distress stemming from rape, for example, or, 44    Avi Issacharoff
needless to say, problems in having children, which pushed her to commit a terrorist 
attack.
For example, a report in Yediot Ahronot states, “This is how terrorist organizations 
recruit female suicide terrorists to commit suicide attacks: ‘If you don’t commit 
a suicide terrorist attack, we’ll tell people you were raped.’ Agents of Fatah and 
Tanzim in the Beit Lehem area rape young Palestinian women, or seduce them 
into having sexual relations. Then they blackmail them by telling them, ‘Either you 
commit suicide attacks, or we’ll tell your family.’ These are reports obtained by 
IDF intelligence sources.” According to these reports, at least as described in Yediot 
Ahronot, special units of rapists are operating on behalf of Tanzim in the Bethlehem 
area with the express purpose of cultivating female suicide terrorists, though the 
special rapist units obviously play no direct part in the terrorist attacks.
The female suicide terrorist is given preferential treatment in the Israeli media, 
while the man is judged harshly. Men are ostensibly driven solely by motives of 
security and economics, and we journalists rarely ask any questions at all about 
whether the man was unable to get married and whether the social status of an 
involuntarily unwed Muslim man is good. We pay much less attention to these 
matters with male suicide terrorists than in the case of a female suicide terrorist.
This approach has been characteristic of the Israeli press since the emergence of 
the female terrorists during the intifada. In February 2002, the local newspaper Kol 
Hazman wrote about Wafa Idris, the first female suicide terrorist: “Her father died 
when she was eight years old. Her brother served ten years in an Israeli prison, and 
founded al-Aqsa Brigades in the al-Amri refugee camp. Her husband divorced her 
after she had a miscarriage in the seventh month of pregnancy, and two months 
ago, she refused to remarry. Is it possible that Wafa Idris, a paramedic in the Red 
Crescent, committed suicide this week on Jaffa Street mostly because her life was so 
miserable?”
Other examples of excessive interest in personal details abound. In February 
2004, following the killing of Hamas member Abed al-Nasser Abu-Shuka, a great 
deal of gossip was written about willingness of Rim Riashi, the terrorist from the 
Erez border crossing who was Hamas’s first female suicide terrorist, to carry out a 
suicide attack. The Maariv newspaper wrote, “The terrorist killed in Gaza was the 
lover of the female suicide terrorist from Erez. When the illicit affair between the 
Hamas man and a married woman was discovered, her lover equipped her with 
an explosive belt, and sent her on a suicide mission at the Erez border crossing. 
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Abed al-Nasser Abu-Shuka, was the lover of Rim Riashi, the suicide terrorist who 
committed the attack at the Erez border crossing a month ago.” It is as if al-Reyashi 
had no say at all in the matter. We journalists tend to treat female suicide terrorists 
with kid gloves.
Another report in Maariv concerned Souad Aslan, a female suicide terrorist or, 
more accurately, a Palestinian woman who planned to commit a suicide bombing 
and was stopped before she could carry out the attack. Maariv reported, “In Dil 
8, Souad Aslan from Gaza was critically wounded by an exploding gas canister in 
her home. She was hospitalized for nine months in a hospital with her entire body 
covered by burns, and is still in need of surgery. Her story, however, is even more 
tragic. In addition to the burns covering her skin, Aslan is alone. She is single, and 
says that she has no friends. Since she was wounded, she has stopped studying, and 
has neither resumed her studies nor worked. What has she done all these years? She 
has mostly taken care of the house, and has spent the rest of her time praying and 
watching children’s programs on television.”
A particularly pitiful story about a Palestinian woman named Rasha, who planned 
to commit a suicide terrorist attack and was arrested, was published in a weekend 
magazine of Yediot Ahronot in November 2004. “Rasha was born a year before the 
beginning of the first intifada,” the newspaper wrote, and continued:
When she was born, her father, Khaled, was no longer near her. He left 
her mother, Mariam, when she was pregnant. Several months after the 
birth, Rasha’s mother married another man, and gave birth to two sons 
– Rasha’s younger brothers. Since she was born, her father, Khaled, has 
lived close to them in the camp, but he kept away from them. He was 
geographically close, but they were very far from his heart. All during 
her childhood and teenage years, Rasha tried to get close to him, but he 
avoided her. He even ordered his young children from his new wife to 
stay away from his beautiful daughter, Rasha. He broke her heart very, 
very badly, her mother repeated to me. “Not only did he keep away 
from her and not recognize her; he also caused her terrible problems, 
because young men attracted by her beauty stayed away from her. With 
us, when a man looks for a girl, he wants to be introduced to her parents. 
Her family history is no less important than her looks. Rasha had a 
difficult family history. There was no father to whom she could present 
a prospective groom. She was a wonderful daughter, a good student, 
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tears. “She did everything to attract his attention. When he drew away 
from her, he marked her as damaged, and she became depressed. She, 
who was once so active and full of life and helped me with everything, 
stopped eating, and sat alone in her room. She was attracted to wanted 
terrorists,” her mother told me. “Perhaps because she had no father, 
she was swept away by strong men. Perhaps she identified with people 
who were being hunted, whose lives were in danger.”
The way Israelis perceive the status of Muslim women obvious plays a key 
role in the compulsive attention paid by the Israeli media to the personal family 
circumstances that bring Palestinian women to commit suicide attacks. Right or 
wrong, we journalists mostly regard a Muslim woman as someone whose role is 
confined to the kitchen and childbearing. Taking part in terrorist attacks and warfare 
is considered especially unusual. Take, for example, a story in Kol Ha’ir, a local 
Jerusalem newspaper, about suicide attacks. This is how the reporter describes the 
Palestinian woman: “Barring exceptional cases, women are under the tutelage of their 
father until their marriage. In the absence of their father, their brothers are responsible 
for them. After marriage, the woman obviously comes under the guardianship of 
her husband. In effect, in most cases, every significant movement by a Palestinian 
woman, such as shopping far from her home, requires the consent of her husband or 
father.” The reporter goes on to describe Wafa Idris. “Twenty-seven year old Idris, a 
refugee, was among those with the lowest status in Palestinian society. She lived in 
the al-Amri refugee camp. Her father was dead. Her relationship with her brother 
was tense and stormy. Her cousin, Ahmad, divorced her after nine years of marriage 
with no children. All this made her abnormal. A barren divorcee who returns to 
her parents’ home is a nightmare for most Palestinian families. Economically, she 
was a burden, and her chances of remarrying and leaving her parents’ home were 
negligible.”
In the first two cases of female suicide terrorists, the profile assembled by the 
press and defense agencies in Israel indeed matched the perpetrators. Wafa Idris and 
Dareen Abu Aisha were divorced and childless. However, the next female suicide 
terrorists were eighteen year old Aayat al-Ahras from Bethlehem, Andalib Taqtaqah 
from Beit Fajar, and Hiba Daraghme from Tubas, who deviated from the profile 
of women with problems. These young women had no unusual social problems, 
and perhaps therefore various writers concentrated on the storm that their terrorist 
attacks aroused in the Palestinian public and the great anger of their families. The 
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with understanding by the families of female suicide terrorists. The writer of one 
story hinted that their families might even be glad of their deaths, because a barren 
divorcee  who  returns  to  her  parents’  home  is  a  nightmare  for  most  Palestinian 
families.
And what of the Arab media? Arab journalists usually ignore any personal details 
of a woman who committed a suicide terrorist attack. And to the credit of the Arab 
media, however, let it be said that they almost always omit the personal aspect in 
cases of suicide terrorist attacks committed by men as well. Media discussion of 
female perpetrators is confined to a dry report, with slight hints of a hostile response 
from the family; the terrorist organizations’ need for operational assistance from 
women; and of course the Muslim religious and social issue of women’s involvement 
in suicide terrorist attacks.1
On the day following the terrorist attack by Zina Abu Salem from the Askar 
refugee camp on September 23, 2004, the Palestinian newspaper al-Ayyam reported 
that  al-Aqsa  Brigades  had  taken  responsibility  for  the  attack.  The  newspaper 
reported that the attack was an act of revenge for the crimes of the occupation, the 
targeted killings, and the like. A few details about the terrorist’s family were given. 
It was mentioned, almost in passing, that her father and mother had been taken to 
a hospital after feeling unwell. The national perspective is reported first, with only 
marginal mention made of a personal perspective.
Immediately after the first suicide terrorist attack by a woman, the January 2002 
attack in Jerusalem by Wafa Idris, the Arab media debated extensively the question 
of the legitimacy of women’s involvement in suicide attacks. For example, the Arab 
newspaper al-Quds, published in London, quoted the Fatah Revolutionary Council 
as saying, “The martyr’s death of Wafa restored honor to the national role of the 
Palestinian woman, who has carried out the most remarkable exploits in the long 
struggle for national freedom. The Palestinian woman reiterates that she stands at the 
side of the men in the struggle for freedom.” Qais Abdul Karim from the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine added, “The martyr’s death of that flower, Wafa, 
proves that all sectors of our people, men and women, each at the other’s side, are 
united in the struggle for freedom, and in the confrontation with aggression.”
While  the  responses  of  the  secular  terrorist  organizations  were  enthusiastic, 
Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, head of the most prominent religious terrorist 
organization, sounded more ambivalent, at least initially. He explained why, from a 
religious standpoint (or, if not from a religious standpoint, at least from an operational 
standpoint),  there  was  no  need  for  women  to  be  involved  in  terrorist  attacks, 48    Avi Issacharoff
and  why  such  involvement  was  completely  undesirable.  He  said,  “The  Islamic 
movement cannot absorb all the Palestinian men demanding to participate in jihad 
and acts of self sacrifice.” He continued, “A time will come in the future of decisive 
confrontation with the Israeli occupier, and then men, women, and old people will 
take part in the jihad. Meanwhile, however, there is no military organization for 
women under the auspices of the movement, and we have no real need for them.” 
Yassin elegantly rejected the involvement of women in suicide terrorist attacks, 
although his colleagues in Hamas justified it. Two years later, Yassin himself gave 
religious approval for Rim Riashi to commit the first suicide terrorist attack by a 
woman under Hamas sponsorship. Similarly, other leaders of Hamas also support 
the involvement of women in terrorist attacks, Sheikh Hassan Yusef, one of the 
leading Hamas figures in the West Bank, told me in an interview in Ramallah. It is 
permissible for a Muslim woman to fight against occupation and take part in the 
jihad, he said.
The feminist perspective was featured in the Arab and Palestinian media. For 
example, the Egyptian newspaper al-Akhbar wrote about Idris, “The body parts of 
the shahida outlined the change on the earth of the fatherland, and in the ideology of 
the struggle. Palestinian women have torn the gender classification out of their birth 
certificates, declaring that sacrifice for the Palestinian homeland would not be for men 
alone; on the contrary, all Palestinian women will write the history of the liberation 
with their blood, and will become time bombs in the face of the Israeli enemy. They 
will not settle for being mothers of martyrs. The intifada is continuing, and its coals 
will burn until victory is born,” obviously from the womb of the intifada.
At the same time, this attitude has also drawn some criticism. The sympathy 
expressed by some of the Arab media has also sparked dialogue and debate on 
the issue. For example, following the action of Rim Riashi, Fatah personnel and 
representatives of the secular terrorist organizations wrote in a Fatah publication,
A 22 year old girl, mother of two children, one of them a baby and 
the other a little girl, carried out an act of self-sacrifice. Who issued a 
Muslim religious ruling depriving the baby of its mother? Who decided 
to add two more orphans to the list of Palestinian orphans? On the 
basis of which passages in the Qur’an and the Hadith does a young 
mother abandon her true jihad role, which is raising two children, one 
of whom needs her milk? By what right do they present us to the world 
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In this case, the Arab press is commenting on the principle of the participation of 
married women and mothers in suicide terrorist attacks, certainly not romantic 
affairs.
In an article published in al-Quds in January 2004, Abd al-Aziz Rantisi responded 
to reports that Rim Riashi was having an illicit affair. He wrote, “I ask forgiveness 
from you for not permitting my pen to write the substance of what the Zionists 
and their agents devised in the interpretation that they gave to this colossal act, 
and other acts carried out by women.” He continued, “All the things that were said 
in the Zionist press concerning the motives that made a woman in the flower of 
her youth, the mother of two children, sacrifice herself, are a figment of the Zionist 
imagination, biblical, fraudulent, and disgraceful.” Rantisi’s claim was that all those 
who attributed these terrorist attacks to personal motives were serving the Zionists, 
which may account for the scarcity of comments on personal aspects in the Arab 
media.
In summary, there are those on both sides who present a different perspective. 
For example, in January 2002, the newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, published in London, 
discussed the biography of Wafa Idris extensively, and theorized that her divorce 
and barrenness had led her to commit a suicide terrorist attack. In the Israeli press, 
the best description (in my opinion) was by a senior military source in the weekend 
Maariv. He wrote,
Keep in mind that women aren’t the only ones who commit suicide. 
The  men  who  commit  suicide  also  have  personal  problems.  The 
terrorist organizations look for weak people, sometimes with difficult 
backgrounds and distress. More than once, this distress is of romantic 
origin. For example, there was a terrorist whom we caught in Haifa, 
who wanted to commit suicide because of unrequited love. Some of 
the girls also suffered from unrequited love – crises with a romantic 
background.  Most  of  them  had  personalities  that  made  them  an 
easy target for the terrorist industry. They were introverted, easy to 
influence, and had lost interest in life. I wouldn’t say that all the female 
suicide  terrorists  and  attempted  suicide  terrorists  to  date  have  had 
something in common, other than the desire to commit suicide. There 
are profound discussions about the role of the Palestinian woman in 
publicizing Palestinian terrorism. Up until a certain stage, their job was 
to be mothers, to supply sons, to be a supporter. Later, women received 
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had other jobs since late 2001 and early 2002, which is when it began, 
more or less. The question that the terrorist organizations are asking is 
how to kill as many Israelis as possible. Their main issue is not in favor 
or against women. For them, a woman is just a vehicle for bringing 
the bomb to its target, just like a man. In the case of the Erez border 
crossing, the female terrorist also very much wanted to commit the 
attack, and they may have found it difficult to carry the attack using a 
man, so they chose her. The point is not the personal background of the 
female suicide terrorist, but the fact they succeeded in creating another 
bomb in their suicide terrorist factory.
Notes
1  My thanks to the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) for translating some of 
the reports.
  Female Martyrdom: 
The Ultimate Embodiment of Islamic Existence?
Rivka Yadlin
In January 2002, Wafa Idris, a young Palestinian woman from the al-Amri refugee 
camp adjacent to Ramallah, blew herself up on a crowded Jerusalem street. The Israel 
Defense Forces, Israeli public opinion, and many in the West were taken by surprise, 
if not outright astounded. Conversely, the Arab press, and to a greater degree the 
Islamic press, reacted with elated jubilation. “It’s a woman!” cheered al-Sha’ab, an 
Islamic Egyptian newspaper, in a headline that played on an “It’s a boy!” greeting 
card announcement for the felicitous birth of a son.1 Al-Ahram, a leading Egyptian 
establishment newspaper, saw in Wafa with her dreamy eyes and the mysterious 
smile  on  her  lips  the  likeness  of  Mona  Lisa.2  Some  Islamic  voices  indeed  took 
exception to the novelty, such as Sheikh Tantawi of al-Azhar in Cairo, or Hamas’s 
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who faulted a woman leaving home improperly clad and 
unaccompanied by a male family member for breaching the boundaries of modesty. 
Ultimately, however, both relented and gave approval to such otherwise immoral 
conduct if the goal is as sublime as martyrdom.3
It  was  little  wonder  that  the  West  was  taken  by  surprise.  Not  only  was  the 
phenomenon of a Palestinian female suicide bomber practically unprecedented; it 
also departed from the universal feminine stereotype of women as gentler, softer, 
and certainly less prone to physical aggression than men. In a traditional Muslim 
society (and the majority of Muslim societies are traditional) women are perceived 
moreover as timid, modest, and sexually pure, all of which preclude free inter-gender 
mingling. Whether by free will or social pressure, they are mostly confined to the 
private realm, home, and family; to serving and satisfying their husbands’ needs; 
and to childbirth and childrearing. They are thus associated with the myth of the 
gift of life rather than that of death. Moreover, not only are Muslim women marked 
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even in the days of the emerging Alpha Woman – but such traits and roles are also 
perceived as a social and religious commandment, which has been both internalized 
by women and harshly enforced by their social environment.
Thus, the chorus of responses to this watershed event, which no sooner became 
a phenomenon as more women followed in Wafa’s footsteps, both as planners of 
attacks and as suicide bombers themselves, showed a marked tendency to cast it 
as an aberration. This phenomenon involved women ostensibly unable to marry 
or give birth, or who went astray and were bound to die in any event – in short, 
such as were marginalized by normative society. Typologies that emerged from 
research conducted in Israel on suicide bombers have highlighted the prototype 
of the exploited individual (with women figuring frequently among the ranks of 
the exploited), whereby deviations from society’s behavioral norms are singled out 
as leading to suicide bombing.4 Miriam Cooke of Duke University, a prominent 
feminist researcher and activist for the emancipation of women in the Middle East, 
concluded that female martyrdom must be accounted for by a total despair of the 
Arab woman in the struggle to empower herself against the US, the old colonial 
forces, and her husband. Shibli Telhami of Maryland University and the Brookings 
Institute found evidence in the participation of women in suicide terrorism (prior 
to the participation of Hamas women) for the secularization of the phenomenon. 
In any event, suicide bombers, especially female, are portrayed as coming from an 
aberrant and marginal background.5 
All  this,  however,  is  in  the  eye  of  the  Western  analyst.  A  largely  different 
perspective emerges when the case is viewed from the other side, examined within 
the existential environment of these young women. Some of the points linking the 
female martyrdom phenomenon to the background of the women have also been 
cited in Israeli research, namely, that the foremost condition facilitating martyrdom 
is a favorable social environment and sympathetic media that disseminates favorable 
information within the supportive society.6 Societies as a rule will support a certain 
conduct when it is consonant with the relevant normative mindset and consciousness. 
This mindset, represented today by the principal spokespersons of Muslim societies, 
increasingly propounds an Islamic way of life that may be unassociated with political 
motives and is merely promoting piety and following the religious laws for daily 
conduct. Oftentimes, however, it is interwoven with support for the war effort, with 
the Palestinian dimension at the center joined by the campaign against those hostile 
to the interests of the Islamic nation. Within this atmosphere of destiny and a holy 
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such as “the art of death,” “the death industry,” “the death aspiration,” or “betrothal 
in death.” A culture of self-sacrifice is constructed with the martyrs as culture-heroes, 
the shahid and his family thus enjoying great prestige and admiration (not to speak 
of material reward) within both their immediate surroundings and broader circles 
informed by the media all over the Arab/Muslim world.7
The emergence of women martyrs caused no difficulty in the narrow Muslim 
social liberal circles, since the war effort is of supreme importance on their agenda, 
and men and women should in any case be equal participants. Nawal al-Sa’adawi, an 
anti-Islamist Egyptian pan-Arab activist and feminist, has supported female suicide 
bombers in the course of the current dispute over the definition of terrorism:
Israel and the West call resistance operations “terrorism.” . . .Are we to 
castigate those who fought with their own bare hands and died [doing 
so]? Are we to criticize a woman who loads herself up with explosives, 
blows herself up, and dies? Are we to castigate her for having blown 
herself up after having seen her father and her brothers killed? If I were 
in her place I would load myself up with dynamite and blow myself 
up. . . . How can I castigate the victim?8 
More significantly, however, Islamic gatekeepers from various circles and countries 
(e.g., Sheikh Ali Abu al-Hassan, head of al-Azhar’s Religious Ruling Committee – 
“Fatwa Committee”; the Tabligh Movement; and the al-Qaeda mouthpiece) soon 
joined in supporting women martyrs under the religious ruling that all of Islam’s 
wars are just and holy wars.9 Evidence is brought forth from the Qur’an, which 
addresses men and women as one (33:35), and the legacy of the prophet, who said 
that if a Muslim country is attacked by an enemy, the obligation to wage war – the 
jihad – applies  to each and every Muslim (fardh ‘ayn – an individual obligation, 
rather than fardh kifayah – a collective obligation). Accordingly, a person does not 
fulfill his/her duty through the actions of the Muslim collective, and a woman is 
obligated to go to war, even without permission from her husband. Further evidence 
and legitimization is drawn from the example of women in early Islamic history, 
such as ‘Aishah, wife of the prophet, who led tens of thousands in the Battle of the 
Camel; Safiyyah, his cousin, who killed and beheaded a Jew from the Qurayzah 
tribe; and several other daring brave women who took part in holy warfare.10
The  phenomenon  of  Palestinian  female  suicide  bombers  is  hence  relatively 
new,  somewhat  problematic,  and  calls  for  special  reasoning,  but  nevertheless 
widely accepted and endowed with legitimacy. Can this be taken as an indication 
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empowerment of women according to Western criteria, as stated with satisfaction 
by Western observers? If a woman can choose her death, can she henceforth also be 
free to choose the way she lives?11  
Further consideration of al-Sha’ab, the Islamist publication cheering under the 
headline  “It’s  a  woman,”  indicates  otherwise.  What  was  the  jubilation  about? 
Was it merely about a victory and reinforcement of the ranks, as might indeed be 
concluded from the newspaper’s words: “It’s a woman who taught you today a 
lesson in heroism, that taught you the meaning of jihad; it’s a woman who wrote 
in letters of fire the war of a holy sacrifice, which struck fear into the heart of the 
enemy entity.” Reading on, however, the cardinal message presents itself: “It’s a 
woman who is showing you today, Muslim women, the meaning of true freedom, 
with which women’s rights activists have tempted you…It’s a woman who has now 
proved that the meaning of women’s liberation is to free their body from this world’s 
trials, and to accept death with a powerful brave embrace.” An Egyptian sociologist 
linked with the Muslim Brotherhood expands on this theme (note the mirror image 
of Western views concerning marginality):
The West has already grasped that all the money it spends in order 
to distort the consciousness of the Muslim woman, and to make her 
think that her body and needs are the most important thing… is money 
wasted.  Women  mobilized  by  the  West…  are  unable  to  influence 
women in any Arab country. All their talk about women’s liberation, 
equality with men, and their right to libertine conduct, exposing their 
bodies, flaunting their feminine allure, and similar matters discussed at 
symposia funded by America and the West falls on deaf ears, except for 
a small marginal group of superficial women who have lost all hope.12 
Even the establishment Jordanian newspaper al-Dustur echoes this line: “The Arab 
woman has taken her place and her dignity. It is the women’s rights activists in the 
West who robbed women of their right to be human, and viewed them as bodies 
without souls. . . .Wafa Idris, like the rest of the young women of her generation . . . 
did not carry makeup in her suitcase, but enough explosives to fill the enemies with 
horror . . . .Wasn’t it the West that kept demanding that the Eastern woman become 
equal to the man? Well, this is how we understand equality.”13
Hence  the  approval  and  support  extended  to  female  suicide  bombers  is  not 
merely blessing the enhanced war effort. The jubilation is about the confirmation of 
the path outlined for women by Muslim society, and the emergent proof that Muslim 
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A demand of this sort is widely considered not only as despicable and corrupting, 
but moreover as an attack on the Islamic order – a Western imperialist assault on the 
Muslim mind and its value system.14 The majority of female Muslim activists are 
aware of the prevalent aversion in society to Western feminism and are even party to 
this aversion, and therefore maintain that the way to improve women’s status within 
society and the family is within the dominant normative order. This is done by 
introducing into Muslim annals the “Her Story”15 – history viewed through the role 
of women, thus magnifying that role; and through an alternative interpretation of 
the canonical sources and biographies of Muslim women, a method notably pursued 
by  Fatima  Mernissi,  an  activist  feminist  professor  of  sociology  from  Morocco.16 
Following a similar strategy, Islamist female activists exhibit in the conduct of their 
daily life both a principled rejection of Western values and the internalization of their 
role as guardians of Muslim authenticity.17 What Muslim women say by embracing 
the existing order is: we don’t want to – or cannot – adopt your way. We have our 
own way that is superior as well as effective, based on rational causality that derives 
from our basic principles and is accepted by society.
Their strategy has proven effective. Accepting the injunctions of Islam, whether 
in theory or in practice – such as adopting the hijab, the new version of Islamic dress 
– lifts the ban on female visibility in non-familial male society, frees women of their 
exclusive assignation to the private sphere, and affords them a foothold, freedom of 
movement and activity, and even authority in the public sphere, though short of the 
ultimate top position in government. Indeed, the more groups and organizations 
are closer to Islam, the more they encourage their women to participate in public 
activities.18 Their dissent from the Western version of libertine feminism, which in 
addition to subverting morals positions women against men, mitigates the threat 
it poses both to the aspiration for cosmic purity that hinges on female conduct as 
well as to the patriarchal order in the family (even if this is not explicitly stated), 
and to the Muslim conception of the harmonious society composed of mutually 
complementing camps, male and female.
However,  Muslim  public  discourse  does  not  stop  at  ousting  the  West  from 
its  position  as  a  benchmark  for  universal  values.  That  would  merely  constitute 
parochial disavowal and limiting the validity of Western values to the realm of the 
Western world as a product of the specific course of Western history, falling short of 
its essential refutation. It would mean that it is right for them, but not for us – but 
not constitute a fundamental denial. Islamic spokesmen have previously attempted 
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claiming that it makes the entire world order dependent on man, who is fickle and 
ephemeral.19 Increasingly however, whether as a reaction to the Western “assault” or 
the confidence gained by subaltern cultures in the time of multiculturalism, Muslim 
(not necessarily Islamic) discourse now pushes further, and tries to debunk Western 
liberalism and its claims concerning Muslim women, not merely through the use of 
the limited parochial rationalization of Islam, but also on the home court of Western 
discourse, using the latter’s own tools. This method poses a more defying challenge 
to a broader public, including the Western world.
A model example of this trend is Saba Mahmood, an Egyptian-born Muslim 
feminist,  anthropologist,  and  scholar  of  religious  movements,  well-regarded 
and highly active in the top level of Western academe (Princeton, Chicago, and 
Cambridge).  Mahmood  challenges  Western  liberalism  on  the  whole,20  asserting 
that it is a mistake to assume that human agency (a sociological term connoting the 
ability of autonomous human action to achieve self-fulfillment – a cornerstone of the 
definition of freedom in Western liberal philosophy) necessarily means an internal 
personal and natural aspiration of an individual for freedom and quasi-Promethean 
self-construction. It is a mistake to assume that human agency is the drive to rise up 
against authority and, as far as women are concerned, defy the structures of male 
control.
This  mistaken  assumption  triggers  deprecatory  reactions  by  feminists  across 
the political spectrum regarding the support and participation of women in the 
Islamic movements. A common allegation is that these women are held captive in 
a widespread patriarchal plan, and that if they were released from their shackles, 
they would naturally express their instinctive abhorrence of the traditional Islamic 
practices by which they are bound, particularly at a time in which the opportunities 
for freedom are so great. The fact is, according to Mahmood, that at the heart of 
Muslim women’s conduct lies the principle of sabr – the well-known concept of 
patience.   Thus accepting polygamy, for example, is not considered by pious Muslim 
women as submission to injustice, but rather a demonstration of the virtue of sabr. 
Even more conspicuous is the issue of the hijab. Many studies, including those by 
Muslim feminists, define the desire to wear it according to the researchers’ own 
criteria, hence reaching the conclusion that the motive is social protest, economic 
need, alienation, or utilitarian strategy. The reasons cited by most veiled women – 
morality, religion, and values – are dismissed as the imageries of oppressed people.   
Wrong, says Mahmood. These responses are based on the assumption that in 
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will, not of customs, tradition, or plain enforcement. However, she argues, it is 
logical to assume as well that it is possible that the autonomous will of an individual 
and its self-realization are directed towards non-liberal goals that are consistent 
with customs and tradition. It is likewise logical to assume that it is possible that an 
active and autonomous human agency aspires not necessarily to progressive goals 
of change and rebellion against social conventions, such as wearing jeans and dying 
one’s hair blue, but to finding purpose, value, and pride in an effort to preserve 
tradition and stability and embody them in the appropriate way of life. 
The liberal view regards this as the internalization by women of their (oppressive) 
socialization. It is possible, however, to regard it as an active will to adopt the 
standards  set  for  women  by  divine  commandment,  and  make  them  their  own 
through both external behavior and the construction of a coherent spiritual stance 
that is entrenched and integral to the point where women feel true discomfort when 
values relevant to women are not applied. This discomfort applies not only to the 
conduct of the individual herself, but also to the behavior of the surrounding society, 
behavior that reduces the meaning of Islam to an abstract system of beliefs that does 
not directly affect the daily life of the individual – how to dress, how to speak, which 
hobbies are proper, how to invest money, and what form public discourse should 
take. It can be a process of a conscious effort to reorient aspirations by creating 
harmony  between  internal  motives,  external  actions,  tendencies,  and  emotional 
states through repeated practice of moral deeds.
Furthermore, drawing on Michel Foucault, Mahmood argues that power should 
not be understood merely according to the simplistic binary model of domination/
submission. The ability to act is created and made possible by given relationships of 
submission that are not necessarily passive. It is composed of struggle, effort, and 
achievements. Power in this sense is the way in which someone carries out acts on his/
her thought, body, behavior, and modes of existence in order to achieve a certain state 
of happiness, purity, wisdom, soundness, or eternal life. According to this definition, 
resisting a relationship of domination is only one form of appropriating an active 
human agency; forms of accepting domination and hierarchy may also achieve such 
a state. The Muslim piety movement, researched by Mahmood in Egypt, assumes 
the existence of a divine plan for human life, as expressed in the Qur’an, its exegeses, 
the model of the prophet and his companions, and the moral laws derived from 
them, and every individual must strive, with no legal or other compulsion, to realize 
this plan. In a context in which there is no separating line between the aspirations 
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of external authority is a necessary condition for realizing an individual’s potential, 
i.e., constituting an active human agency.
Mahmood furthermore suggests that the formative role of the social context of 
the individual should be considered in a major way. The individual and her conduct 
are themselves a product of sanctioned traditions that far exceed in their logic and 
power the consciousness of the individual formed by them. It is not possible to 
identify a universal range of a human activity – such as “resistance” – outside the 
framework of the ethical and political conditions where such activities gain their 
particular meaning. 
Mahmood’s  argument  does  not  directly  address  the  phenomenon  of  female 
suicide bombers, but neither does it restrict its conclusions to the researched group 
of the Egyptian Piety movement and may be applied to the issue at hand and offer an 
additional angle for analysis. First, in Palestinian society, as in Arab/Muslim society 
in general, religious devotion is an organizing norm for the ideals the society uplifts. 
The ideal of women’s status and proper conduct, especially when intertwined with a 
strong national sentiment and intense mobilization to glorified warfare for a concrete 
and immediate goal, situates female martyrs in the center of the social consensus, 
rather than the margins. Second, the aspiration for the embodiment of the Islamic 
ideal of existence that emerges in Mahmood’s research may be applied as well to the 
Palestinian martyrs, who perform the ultimate embodiment – the sacrifice of their 
body. The plausibility of their act as an autonomous choice for self-realization through 
acceptance of the prevalent norms in their society, and perhaps most importantly the 
formation of their autonomous consciousness by their society, further situates them 
in a consensual position, rather than in one motivated by aberrancy. 
The  Western  liberal  view  may  find  it  difficult  to  accept  Mahmood’s  claim 
concerning  its  own  relativity  and  the  partial  role  of  its  secular  morality  and 
rationalism in containing the modes of worthy human creativity, even when it relies 
on Western philosophers such as Pierre Bourdieu, Foucault, and a number of the 
most prominent Western feminists.21 This liberal view, however, should take notice 
of this trend as a demonstration of the firm tendency in Muslim discourse to reject 
Western views on women’s liberation, as well as other liberal Western views – such 
as democratization – and the ensuing Western demands and pressures for social and 
political change. It should also take notice of the fact that this rejection is intensifying 
and becoming more self-confident, no longer challenging out of the periphery of 
Muslim orthodoxy, using Islamic parochial rationale, but rather in the heart of the 
Western public sphere, using what the West considers to be universal terms.Female Martyrdom: The Ultimate Embodiment of Islamic Existence?    59
Western researchers may find it easier to accept the claim made by subaltern 
cultures as well as by certain Western researchers, specifically anthropologists,22 that 
in order to observe in an informed way the conduct of the “other,” even if “lacking” 
according to their Western judgment, one must relate to the formative surroundings 
of the individual as a major factor in understanding her conduct. Furthermore they 
may not find it difficult to agree that if the individual in question were formed by her 
surrounding culture, it would include what she may consider as her autonomous 
choice. The ability of Western researchers to observe traditions that are different 
from  their  own  from  within  those  “other”  traditions,  while  putting  aside  their 
own entrenched traditions and logic, may be an important contribution to a better 
understanding of action and political processes in those cultures.
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The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists
Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova
Chechnya’s notorious “Black Widows” have been active since June 7, 2000 when 
the first Chechen female suicide bombers, Khava Barayeva, cousin of well-known 
Chechen field commander Arbi Barayev, and Luisa Magomadova drove a truck 
filled with explosives into the temporary headquarters of an elite OMON (Russian 
Special Forces) detachment in the village of Alkhan Yurt in Chechnya. The attack 
resulted in two dead and five wounded. Since then Chechen female terrorists have 
been involved in twenty-two of the twenty-seven suicide attacks (81 percent of the 
total number) attributed to Chechen rebels. There were a total of 110 bombers1 in 
the period reviewed, forty-seven of whom were women (43 percent of the total; see 
table 1).2
Chechen  women  bombers  were  named  Black  Widows  by  the  Russian  and 
international press when it became clear that many were acting in revenge for the 
deaths of their husbands, sons, and brothers. Since the Dubrovka Theater takeover 
in October 2002, in which nineteen female bombers appeared in black mourning 
clothes  with  bombs  strapped  to  their  bodies,  we  have  engaged  in  a  particular 
multi-dimensional means of studying these terrorists. The first avenue involved 
interviewing surviving hostages who had the opportunity to observe and converse 
with the bomb-girded women, which provides a singular perspective on suicide 
terrorists. The second measure involved interviewing the women’s family members 
and  close  associates  in  Chechnya  after  the  death  or  arrest  of  the  bombers,  to 
construct a type of psychological post-mortem of the bomber.3 The third measure 
was studying news reports and talking to Russian security officials involved in the 
investigations of such cases. To date we have a sample of forty-five interviews with 
family members, close associates, or former hostages of thirty-four suicide bombers, 
twenty-six of them Chechen female suicide terrorists. 64    Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova
Table 1. Summary of Suicide Terror Attacks Attributed to Chechens (June 2000-June 
2005)
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1 June 7, 2000 Chechnya, Alkhan-Yurt mlitary 
base (Khava Barayeva, Luiza 
Magomadova) 
2 2 0 2 5 0 Dead 
2 June, 2000 Chechnya, military checkpoint 1 0 1 ? ? 0 Dead 
3 July 2, 2000 Chechnya, military base 
(Movladi)
1 0 1 33 81 0 Dead 
4 Dec. 2000 Chechnya, MVD building 
(Mareta Duduyeva)
1 1 0 ? ? 0 Wounded, 
later dead
5 Nov. 29, 2001 Chechnya, Urus-Martan,
Military office (Elza Gazueva)
1 1 0 1 3 0 Dead
6 Feb. 5, 2002 Chechnya, Grozny, Zavodskoy 
ROVD (Zarema Inarkaeva)
1 1 0 23 17 0 Wounded
7 Oct. 23-26, 2002 Moscow, Dubrovka Theater 40 1 21 129 644 <800 Dead
8 Dec. 27, 2002 Chechnya, Grozny, governmental 
complex (Tumrievs family)
3 1 2 83 <200 0 Dead
 May 12, 2003 Chechnya, Znamenskaya, 
governmental complex
3 1 2 59 111 0 Dead
10 May 14, 2003 Chechnya, Iliskhan-Yurt, religion 
festival (Shahidat Shahbulatova, 
Zulay Abdurzakova)
2 2 0 18 145 0 Dead
11 June 5, 2003 North Osetia, Mozdok
military base (Lida 
Khildehoroeva)
1 1 0 17 16 0 Dead
12 June 20, 2003 Chechnya, Grozny, governmental 
complex (Zakir Abdulazimov)
2 1 1 6 38 0 Dead
13 July 5, 2003 Moscow, rock festival (Zulikhan 
Elihadjieva, Mariam Sharapova)
2 2 0 14 60 0 Dead
14 July 11, 2003 Moscow, Tverskaya Street
(Zarema Mujikhoeva)
1 1 0 1 0 0 Survived
15 July 27, 2003 Chechnya, Grozny, 
military building (Mariam 
Tashukhadjieva)
1 1 0 ? ? 0 Dead 
16 Aug. 1, 2003 North Osetia, military hospital  1 0 1 35 300 0 Dead
17 Dec. 5, 2003 Southern Russian near 
Yessentuki, train (Khadijat 
Mangerieva) 
4 3 1 41 <150 0 Dead
18 Sept. 15, 2003 Ingushetia, FSB office 2 1 1 2 31 0 Dead
1 Dec. 9, 2003 Moscow, National Hotel near 
Duma
1 1 0 6 14 0 DeadBlack Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists    65
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20 Feb. 6, 2004 Moscow subway station 
Avtozavodskaya
1 0 1 41 <130 0 Dead
21 April 6, 2004 Ingushetia, president’s car 1 0 1 2 25 0 Dead
22 Aug. 25, 2004 Airplane TU-134 Moscow-
Volgograd (Sazita Jebirhanova)
1 1 0 43 0 0 Dead
23 Aug. 25, 2004 Airplane TU-154 Moscow-Sochi 
(Aminat Nogaeva)
1 1 0 42 0 0 Dead
24 Aug. 31, 2004 Moscow, subway station Rijskaya 1 1 0 10 33 0 Dead
25 Sept.1-3, 2004 North Osetia, Beslan school 
(Roza Nogaeva, Mariam 
Tuburova)
32 2 30 330 470 1120 Dead
26 May, 2005 Chechnya, Grozny 1 1 0 0 0 0 Dead
27 May, 2005 Chechnya, Assinovskaya 2 2 0 0 0 0 Dead
Total 110 47 63 938 2473 1920
Percent 100% 43% 57%
The total of forty-seven Chechen female bombers is based on reports of twenty-
five successful female bombers (i.e., they detonated their bombs and died by truck, 
car bomb, or improvised explosive device – suicide belt or bag, including two who 
exploded bombs on airplanes); three unsuccessful female bombers (two exploded 
their  devices  but  were  wounded  only;  one  walked  away  from  her  bomb-filled 
rucksack); and nineteen women who took part in the Dubrovka takeover (who wore 
bombs wrapped around their bodies but did not die by self-detonation). There is 
some controversy as to whether or not the Dubrovka bombers were indeed suicide 
bombers,  as  their  plan  to  die  by  exploding  themselves  was  interrupted  by  the 
Russian Special Forces gassing and storming the building. Instead, the females died 
of gunshots to the head after succumbing to the gas. We have strong confirmation 
from many family members, close associates, and hostages of these individuals’ 
intent to self-detonate, as well as evidence of intent in the fact that the women were 
already clad with suicide belts. Thus, we take their stated intent and their behavior of 
strapping on bombs as strong enough evidence to classify them as suicide bombers 
for the purpose of this analysis. We consider this analogous to the many Palestinian 
bombers  currently  incarcerated  who  were  thwarted  in  the  last  moments  before 
their attempts, but who are also closely studied to understand the psychology and 
psycho-social aspects of suicide bombers.66    Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova
We lack demographic data on all of the bombers, but of those about whom we 
conducted specific psychological interviews (n=34; 26 female and 8 male) the females 
range in age from fifteen to thirty-eight. They include both married and unmarried, 
and of those who were married, some were mothers while at least one suffered 
from infertility. Thirteen were single, three were married, four divorced, five were 
widows, and one was in a second marriage. As is true of suicide bombers active in 
other arenas,4 the female bombers in our sample were as educated as their peers of 
the same age. More than 65 percent (65.3 percent – 17/26) had finished high school 
(ages 14-16, as per the Chechen system); 11.5 percent (3/26) were currently studying 
in college (ages 17-20); 4 percent (1/26) had finished college; and 19.2 percent (5/26) 
had finished their university studies (table 2). 
Table 2. Demographic Data, Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists 2000-2005 (n=26)
Marital Status Education 
Completed
Economic 
Status
Previous 
Religiosity
Relation to 
Wahhabism
Trauma*
13 – single 17 – high school 2 – poor 22 – secular 
Muslims
1 – connected 
after traumas
12 – more than one family 
member killed
3 – married 1 – college 14 – middle 4 – traditionally 
religious
7 – connected 
through family
4 – father or mother was 
killed
4 – divorced 5 – university  – good 6 – brother killed
5 – widowed 3 – in college 1 – high 1 – husband killed
1 – remarried 3 – family members arrested 
or disappeared after arrest
2 – general societal traumas
* Total greater than sample size as some individuals suffered multiple types of traumas 
Motivational Sets
Trauma
As far as we could discern, none of the Chechen suicide bombers in our sample 
had a serious personality disorder prior to deciding to join a terror group. No less 
important,  however,  is  that  all  individuals  within  the  sample  had  experienced 
deep personal traumatization, and evidence of symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder and dissociative phenomena as a result of direct personal traumatization 
were present in the entire sample. This level of psychological traumatization was 
very likely one of the deepest leading motivational factors that drew the Chechen 
bombers into embracing terrorism ideologies and, ultimately, terrorist acts.5 Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists    67
As far as we are able to reconstruct, nearly all of the Chechen suicide bombers 
(male and female) followed a very similar path to becoming first radicalized and 
then eventually purveyors of violence. Nearly all of those we studied lost close 
family members in air raids, bombings, landmines, so called “cleansing” operations 
carried out by Russian forces, and in battle. Many personally witnessed the death, 
beating, or other mistreatment of a family member at the hands of the Russians. 
Family members and close acquaintances of the terrorists noticed that as the violent 
death of a family member or other societal trauma wrought a deep personal impact, 
the “soon to become” terrorist underwent a psychological crisis in which feelings of 
unresolved grief, anger, depression, psychological trauma, and guilt for not having 
done more to save the family member became obvious. According to the reports 
of family members and close associates, the following changes were observed in 
the female suicide bombers following their traumatic experiences: depression in 73 
percent (19/26); social alienation and isolation in 92 percent (24/26); aggression in 23 
percent (6/26); and repetitive talking about a strong desire for revenge in 31 percent 
(8/26). In the majority of cases (73 percent – 19/26), those who ultimately became 
bombers sought a connection to Wahhabist groups6 soon after the trauma and in 
direct reaction to it; in a minority of cases (27 percent – 7/26) they were already 
affiliated with the Wahhabist groups by marriage or family ties but began to become 
more deeply invested in seeking the terror-promoting aspects of these groups.
Revenge
It appears as if answers to the psychological trauma and a means of expressing 
and responding to traumatic grief were sought by the bereaved and traumatized 
individuals through their taking on the jihadist ideology. Indeed, this ideology met 
needs inherent both within the Chechen tradition of seeking revenge for the killing of 
a family member and as defined by general traumatic stress theory.7 In Chechnya the 
traditional concept of revenge for social injustices enacted toward families changes 
dramatically in trauma victims as traumatic experiences impact on the individual’s 
views  regarding  the  moral  basis  of  revenge.  Traditionally  Chechens  live  by  an 
ethos of revenge that mandates that when a loved one is harmed or killed, it is the 
responsibility of the family members to locate the evildoer and exact due recompense. 
This ideology of revenge is strictly codified and does not normally spread beyond 
seeking out the originator of the harm or his close family and requiting his evil deed. 
Recently, however, with widespread war, traumatization and bereavement, and the 
importation of a terrorist mentality this mindset is changing: revenge is becoming 
generalized in the minds of many. Akhmedova found in her study of 653 clinical 68    Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova
subjects who had undergone war traumas that those who had the highest levels of 
post-traumatic effects underwent a transformation in this regard. They endorsed 
revenge in 39 percent of the cases and no longer considered revenge as a duty to find 
and repay in kind the person who had harmed their family, but instead generalized 
their revenge to enact harm on the ethnic sector from which the harm had originated 
(i.e., the Russian military or civilians). With increased traumatization generalized 
revenge became both sufficient and acceptable. There were also positive correlations 
between the endorsement for revenge and increasing levels of religiosity, aggression, 
suspiciousness, and negativism.8 We conclude that all of the women in our sample 
had revenge as a motive. Indeed, before their terror acts, 54 percent (14/26) of the 
women had stated spontaneously to those we interviewed that they would seek 
revenge for the violent death of their family member at the hands of the Russians.  
Religious Ideology
Generally a person who undergoes a deep personal trauma experiences a shattering 
of world assumptions9 (for example, regarding personal safety, predictability, and 
goodness of the world) and often undergoes a dissociative response10 to the trauma 
in which certain elements are just too emotionally overwhelming and painful to 
incorporate at once into one’s sense of self in the world. Trauma victims are often 
dissociative  in  response  to  their  experiences,  displaying  amnesia,  emotional 
numbing, and a sense of social alienation. A huge part of the healing process in 
response to psychological trauma is to reconstruct both a personal narrative and a 
worldview that incorporates the traumatic event. A religion-based terrorist ideology 
that  incorporates  national  tradition  and  even  the  obligation  to  avenge  a  family 
member can serve this need in the short run, providing a type of psychological first 
aid that is necessarily short-lived if it ends in the individual becoming a human 
bomber as a result. 
The jihadist ideology thus provides ill-fated psychological help to the trauma 
victim in the short run as a result of the terror-sponsoring organization’s distorted use 
of Islam to further its political goals. In light of the two wars over the past decade, the 
continued conflicts, and the current violent counterterrorism measures in Chechnya, 
Chechens as a whole have suffered widespread psychological traumatization. No 
individual or family has been untouched by the effects of carpet-bombing of cities, 
war, violence, and death, and nearly everyone has experienced violence of some 
sort. Similarly, the wars effected a demographic disaster in Chechnya during this 
period. Chechnya lost a huge portion of its population to death and refugees fleeing 
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Chechen nation was also decimated by Stalin’s destructive deportation policies. The 
current widespread societal trauma provides fertile ground for some segments of 
society to embrace a new non-indigenous form of radicalized Islam. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that this occurs only in conjunction with a segment of society’s 
acceptance of a new interpretation of Islam, one that fits a widespread societal need 
to respond to the violent, bereaving, and traumatic situations they have recently 
experienced by subscribing to a newly constructed and violent worldview.12  
Thus,  for  those  individuals  whose  family  integrity  and  sense  of  purpose 
and belonging have been shattered by the violent deaths of family members, the 
religious aspect of the jihadist ideology assumes new prominence as it prescribes 
and signals through new behaviors the belonging to a group and dedication to a 
meaningful life commitment. Symbols of belonging include pursuing a new lifestyle 
and wearing clothing that signifies a new life commitment; these are important in 
filling a vacuum for the trauma victim who is bereaved of key family members and 
who has lost meaning and direction in the midst of the chaos of war and occupation. 
Likewise, new prayer rituals and a comforting view of an afterlife expressed in 
glorified terms for those who die on behalf of God (i.e., martyrs) help to calm the 
traumatized individual, who often in reaction to the trauma develops an expectation 
of a foreshortened lifespan and further violence. Similarly, turning to any religious 
rituals often calms states of bodily arousal and can build upon dissociative phenomena 
in a manner that makes the psychic numbing common in trauma victims seem like 
a useful measure versus an obstacle to rebuilding one’s life. Turning to religion is a 
frequent way of comforting oneself in the face of bereavement with the belief that 
the person mourned lives on in some afterlife. Jihadist ideology makes use of this 
factor as well, stating that not only will the martyr be reunited with loved ones, but 
s/he can guarantee the safe passage to paradise for seventy other persons in the 
family – not a small feat when one feels that life is violent, chaotic, and unpredictable 
and death lurks everywhere.
Those in our sample as well as all other Chechen suicide terrorists whom we 
know of were self-recruited in the early stages of their terrorist journey. The path 
to terrorism nearly always begins with individuals who due to their traumatized 
psychological state are attracted to radical groups and seek out the jihadist ideology 
as they grapple with their rather extreme and violent losses. Less clear is what 
occurs on the side of the organization from the women’s first step of joining the 
terror groups to actually becoming human bombers. We do know that many of the 
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outset they embraced freely and completely the jihadist ideal of becoming martyrs in 
the fight against the Russians. It was clear that in joining these groups and espousing 
the jihadist ideology, a new world view was constructed within the “would-be” 
bombers in which materialism was repudiated; death as a martyr was glorified; 
terrorist violence was justified as a means of carrying out the jihad, i.e., enacting 
justice (from their point of view) against the infidel invader; and the afterlife was 
deemed worthy compensation for sacrificing one’s life. This new worldview was 
generally  accompanied  by  a  total  change  of  mentality  and  changes  in  lifestyle 
(praying frequently, becoming strict in following Muslim codes) and in extreme 
changes in appearance (the hijab for women; long shirts, shorter pants, and a beard 
for men). According to our respondents, all of the women in our sample became 
more religious following their traumatic experiences and spoke increasingly about 
jihad, paradise, and similar religious themes.
Gender
While  some,  mainly  Russian  journalists  have  written  that  Chechen  women  are 
kidnapped, raped, and/or drugged to encourage them to take part in terror activities, 
we have found no evidence for this.13 On the contrary, we find strong evidence of 
self-recruitment and strong willingness to martyr oneself on behalf of one’s country 
and  independence  from  Russia,  to  enact  social  justice  (in  their  perspective)  for 
wrongs done to them, and to avenge for the loss of loved ones in their families. We 
know of only one case where a sister claimed that she was being coerced by her 
brother into suicide terrorism. She was from a family in which two other sisters very 
enthusiastically took part in suicide bombings and prior to that other terror missions. 
This family was split between the mother, who encouraged the children to pursue 
terrorism, and the father, who was angered by their activities and tried to stop them. 
The sister turned herself into the Russian authorities, claiming she needed protection 
from her coercive brother, who had already sent at least four other women as bombers 
– one who turned back from her mission without reprisal, and three who went very 
willingly (including two of her sisters). There were complicating factors in the case 
of some female bombers – wives whose husbands divorced them due to infertility, 
who perhaps as a result were more free and willing to pursue terrorism (although 
they still had professional lives open to them), one woman who was seriously ill, 
and others who were fugitives who could face fates worse than death if caught. Still, 
in all these cases they retained the main trauma-based motivational core and these 
other issues appeared to be simply supplemental motivating factors. Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists    71
As far as we can tell the motivational mechanism for seeking out a terror group 
generated at first by deep personal traumatization did not differ by gender in any 
way. Both genders in our sample had suffered violent losses of family members and 
were overtaken by concerns for restoring social justice, something that a religious 
ideology often panders to and takes advantage of. Indeed as one author wrote 
about the Black Widows: their desperation “allows them to be deceived into being 
devout.”14 
Chechen Terror Networks and Organizations
Marc Sageman studied a select group of global salafist jihadi terrorists and wrote 
that one of the clearest factors inciting a potential terrorist to action is his or her 
relationship to a terror network: that recruitment occurs through friendship and 
familial relations.15 We do not see this aspect as the main motivational force for 
Chechens, although it is definitely a factor in who becomes a terrorist. Instead we 
see deep personal and overwhelming psychological trauma, traumatic bereavement, 
symptoms of traumatic stress, and subsequent adherence to terrorist ideology as a 
form of psychological first aid as the main motivational set. We do, however, strongly 
agree that terrorist recruitment occurs through friendship and familial relations. 
Indeed, many of the main terrorist leaders (some now dead) married strategically 
in Chechnya and Ingushetia across regions that ensured that when they needed safe 
houses and support from the wider familial networks of their wives, they would not 
be refused, by virtue of the strong Chechen tradition to help family members. In our 
sample we found that 27 percent (7/26) of the female bombers acted in concert with 
other family members in carrying out a suicide attack: there were two pairs of sisters 
present in the Dubrovka Theater takeover; one sister exploded herself on a plane in 
August 2004, with her sister shortly following her lead in the Beslan school takeover; 
and a father, son, and daughter detonated themselves in a governmental complex 
in Grozny.  Twenty-seven percent (7/26) of the women in our sample were married 
or connected by familial ties to Wahhabists prior to becoming involved in terrorism. 
Proximity to already active terrorists and to terrorist ideology indeed seems to be a 
strong factor for recruitment.
We lack detailed information as to any military/guerrilla training the women 
received, as family members and close acquaintances were generally unaware of 
these details. It was clear to us that some though not our entire sample spent time 
in terrorist training camps. From family member interviews we learned that prior to 
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to engage in a short buying/trading time in Moscow or elsewhere. We conjecture that 
training, if it occurred at all, was short, as most female bombers who left home prior 
to their actions usually left for extremely short periods of time prior – in general, two 
weeks. Thus while during the time between leaving home and traveling to the terror 
scene some time may have been spent in training, it is our understanding that very 
little training is done for Chechen bombers and that once the ideology is adopted 
it is simply a matter of equipping the woman with a bomb and sending her to her 
target.
Chechen women are much more emancipated than their Arab sisters. While family 
structure is still traditional, it is common for Chechen women to attend university 
and to hold full-time jobs outside their homes.16 Journalist Barbara Victor writes that 
perhaps Palestinian female bombers choose suicide terrorism as a means of escaping 
the tight constraints of traditional roles to become in the short run and in history 
equal to men.17 We do not see this as a viable explanation with Chechen female 
bombers. Indeed, during peacetime many non-traditional roles were open to them. 
Several in our sample were pursuing higher education and had the possibility of 
working in professional roles that were disrupted by war. One woman, for instance, 
was studying history in the university and planned to transfer to law and become a 
lawyer. However, the last two wars in Chechnya have disrupted most people’s plans 
and hopes for economic or academic success. 
In terms of power structure Chechen terror organizations are male-run, with 
women serving in subservient and traditional roles: cooking, cleaning, bandaging 
the wounded, nursing, and so on, although three female bombers did break out of 
these defined roles: one learned to shoot guns and drive, and another set of sisters 
learned to explode grenades, plant landmines, and shoot guns. Overall, however, 
Chechen women who join terror groups in Chechnya actually move backwards in 
some ways. They take on traditional Arab dress which has never been indigenous 
to Chechnya, including the hijab, and devote themselves to more traditional roles 
within the groups, except for when they undertake violent missions. Thus it was 
only when the women endured many traumas and the effects of war obstructed 
many of life’s options that had been open to them previously, that they moved in 
dress and ideology into fundamentalist roles that did not even exist prior to the 
war, while at the same moment taking on the perhaps more emancipated roles of 
warriors. 
When considering how Chechen terror organizations function in regard to the role 
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weapon with the goal of spawning widespread terror in a larger audience in order to 
create changes in public sentiment that may aid the terror organization in achieving 
its political goals. Palestinians only started to use women as bombers when the 
checkpoints became increasingly difficult for men to cross, and women initially had 
more success in arousing less suspicion and undergoing less rigorous searches. This 
was not the case for Chechens who used women bombers from the start – most 
likely due to their willingness, availability, high motivational status, and greater 
emotional impact on their target audience. Chechen terror organizations galvanized 
world attention by staging a spectacular drama in the Dubrovka Theater House 
takeover, in which nineteen women dressed in black were shown on a pre-recorded 
video and in news coverage horrifyingly displaying bombs prominently strapped 
to their bodies. Likewise, the use of women bombers on planes, trains, and in the 
subways has implanted in Russians a feeling of all-pervasive danger, potentially 
presenting anytime and anywhere, from the gentler of genders. Not only does this 
create a sense of horror in the wider audience, but it has caused some to question 
what drives Chechen women to such desperate measures. 
In terms of organizational structures, we learned that the decision-making, routes 
to, and motives for becoming a bomber appear to be very similar among male and 
female terrorists, but that the men are in charge and they give the orders. It was clear 
from our hostage interviews that the women terrorists in the Moscow siege were 
clearly in a subservient role to the men. This may have even played out in how it 
ended. When the Russians stormed the theater the men left the main hall to fight 
and the women remained behind with the bombs, which they lacked authority to 
detonate. Whether they were able to make this decision on their own is unknown, as 
they lost their chance to detonate when the gas overtook them.18 Likewise whenever 
Chechen women have traveled to carry out a terror act, they travel with an older 
woman or appropriate chaperone. In other words, traditional roles of protecting 
women are still preserved up to the point where she sacrifices herself for the group.
Religious Ideology 
Chechen suicide terrorism is bound to Wahhabist terror ideology. All but one female 
bomber whom we know of had deeply embraced the Wahhabist jihadist ideology, 
which in Chechnya is used to justify terrorism as a means of enacting revenge and 
social justice and acting on behalf of a nationalist separatist movement. All were 
extremely dedicated to their cause and successful in their mission, the exception being 
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criminal concerns more than terrorist ideology. This woman is Zarema Mujikhoeva 
who put her bomb down on a Moscow street and walked away from it. She was later 
arrested and told many false stories to the police and journalists about coercion in 
the Chechen groups that she subsequently admitted were inaccurate. Many analysts 
of Chechen female bombers rely solely on her accounts, despite the fact that they 
were in the main false and certainly not typical of other women’s stories. 
In accordance with the global salafi jihadist ideology promoted by al-Qaeda, 
Osama Bin Laden, and others, Wahhabist terrorist ideology in Chechnya glorifies 
martyrdom and promotes jihad on behalf of creating a global Muslim caliphate. Prior 
to the first war in Chechnya this type of Islam was not present. It was imported from 
Arab regions through al-Qaeda-type terror networks that were active in building 
mosques and madrassas throughout Chechnya and spreading their form of Islam.19
The Russian government often claims that the Chechen terror movement exists 
due to outside funding and forces, but this ignores the very real human rights abuses 
occurring in Chechnya that continue to fuel terror acts as well as the nationalist 
separatist  dream.20  Likewise,  the  separatist  movement  began  as  a  completely 
secular one, yet when the Chechen separatists were faced with the overwhelming 
force of the Russian military, the carpet-bombing of Grozny, and other displays of 
exceptional power, they found themselves increasingly trapped into accepting help 
from religiously oriented groups that promoted a terrorist ideology. Hence while one 
sees an ideology that accords with the global salafi jihad, in Chechnya it is focused 
mainly on recruiting on behalf of a nationalist cause and independence from what is 
seen as a brutal, repressive regime, although this cause is now spreading throughout 
the Caucuses region as well.21 As the motivations for the bombings derive in the 
most  part  from  the  dynamics  of  the  conflict,  and  achieving  worldwide  Muslim 
domination has never been the Chechen separatist aim, it is not likely that suicide 
bombings would continue if Chechnya achieved a real negotiated peace with Russia, 
including withdrawals of troops and federal forces.
Community Support for Female Suicide Terrorism
There is currently very little community support for suicide terrorism in Chechnya, 
male or female. While the entire Chechen population has been devastated by war 
and human rights violations, most Chechens still believe in civil society and hope 
for peace. They do not expect good results from terrorism and condemn the terror 
groups and bombers. This condemnation cuts across genders and there is neither 
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four Chechen close associates and family members of the suicide terrorists were 
hard-pressed  to  support  their  family  members  and  friends.  Twenty-one  percent 
(7/34)  expressed  pity  for  the  suicide  terrorists;  23  percent  (8/34)  expressed  not 
pity but understanding of the suicide terrorists’ motives; 44 percent (15/34) felt the 
bombers were used by terrorist organizations and/or the FSB (formerly the KGB); 
and 12 percent (4/34) went so far as to criticize the suicide terrorists directly. An 
overwhelming 59 percent of respondents (20/34, though not all of the 34 were asked 
specifically about hostages) spontaneously expressed pity for the hostages of suicide 
terrorists. 
In many ways this lack of widespread community support for suicide terrorism 
is similar to Palestinian society during the time period between the first and second 
intifadas, but over time a cult of martyrdom that generated posters, videos, songs, 
and  societal  glorification  grew  up  in  Palestinian  society  in  support  of  suicide 
terrorism. It is possible that given conditions of continued human rights violations, 
the same could occur in Chechnya over time. Those sectors of society that do glorify 
the bombers have already made a song in memory of the first female bomber, Khava 
Barayeva, which enjoys popularity among Chechen youth. Hence it appears that 
while Palestinians and other fundamentalist Muslim groups were loath to use women 
as bombers and only used them as a last resort when they became an expedient 
means of crossing increasingly closed borders, the Chechen terror groups found 
no barriers to using women from the start. This is likely because Chechen women 
prior to the war already enjoyed a Soviet-type of feminism in terms of equality in 
education and opportunity to work in many professions. Thus from the outset to 
volunteer as bombers alongside the men is in keeping with their more egalitarian 
occupational traditions. 
Conclusion
Chechen women have been active from the first as suicide bombers. They do not 
appear coerced, drugged, or otherwise enticed into these acts. On the contrary, they 
are self-recruited on the basis of seeking a means of enacting social justice, revenge, 
and warfare against what they perceive as their nation’s enemy. All the women in 
our sample had been deeply personally traumatized and bereaved by violent deaths 
in their near families or all about them, and we believe this formed the basis for 
their self-recruitment into terrorist organizations. Trauma alone, however, would 
not have motivated them into terrorism: it had to be coupled with a terror promoting 
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the women in our sample were religiously motivated by Wahhabist violent jihadist 
ideology and were seeking to become martyrs, believing they would be reunited 
with loved ones in paradise and enjoy the benefits of their family members being 
admitted to paradise as a result of their act.
While Wahhabists terror groups have managed to radicalize a small segment of 
Chechen society, the majority of Chechen women (and society as a whole) does not 
currently support suicide terrorism. They support civil society and want to see an 
end to the conflicts and violent counterterrorism operations, valuing these as much 
higher goals than achieving national independence. Nevertheless, an extremely small 
group of radicalized Chechens continues to be a severe threat. As Ramzan Kadyrov, 
vice premier of the Russian-backed Chechen government said in his interview to 
Chechen TV on May 11, 2005, Chechen women are the most dangerous for national 
security because they have carried out the most risky operations. If the current trend 
continues, Chechen female bombers will continue to be a grave threat to Russian 
national security. 
Notes
1  We have classified suicide bombers as anyone who goes so far as to strap on a bomb or 
drive a vehicle filled with explosives to a target, or who otherwise attempts to detonate 
an explosive device on an airplane or elsewhere with the aim of dying to kill, irrespective 
of whether or not the bomber actually died in the attack or was successful in detonating – 
as that is often not within the bomber’s control. We take the point of strapping on a bomb 
or other type of improvised explosive device or driving a vehicle loaded with explosives 
to a target as enough evidence of seriousness of the intent to commit suicide, and we see 
the end result, which is often out of the hands of the bomber, as less meaningful than the 
intent implied by these actions.
2  These numbers are based upon our database of attacks attributed to Chechens as of late 
June 2005. Quantifying the exact number of attacks, gender of bombers, and so on is 
difficult as reports vary by government and news source and the gender of accomplished 
bombers is not always evident after an attack. In every case we have used the more 
conservative  estimates,  as  our  experience  with  journalists  reporting  in  and  about 
Chechnya is that they have difficulty getting reports and sometimes rely on rumors. See 
table 1 for a complete account regarding suicide terror acts attributed to Chechens.
3  See Edwin S. Shneidman, The Suicidal Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), in 
which he discusses the concept of a psychological autopsy following a normal suicide. 
Shneidman also coined the term “psyche ache,” psychic pain referring to deeply felt Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists    77
emotions that are painful to the individual. He argued that the best predictor of an 
individual’s propensity to suicide is when emotional pain is experienced as overwhelming 
and inescapable.
4  See Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 200 (March 2003): 534; also Scott 
Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 67-90.
5  See  Anne  Speckhard  &  Khapta  Akhmedova,  “Mechanisms  of  Generating  Suicide 
Terrorism: Trauma and Bereavement as Psychological Vulnerabilities in Human Security 
– The Chechen Case,” in Jill Donnelly, ed. Nato Science Series, Brussels, 2004 for an 
additional discussion of this factor in regard to Chechens; Anne Speckhard and Khapta 
Akhmedova,  “Talking  to  Terrorists,”  Journal  of  Psychohistory  (Fall  2005);  and  Anne 
Speckhard, “Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and their 
Senders,” in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat, 
vol. I, eds. Jason S. Purcell and Joshua D. Weintraub, Atlantic Council Publication, 2005.
6  Wahhabism is a non-indigenous form of Islam originating in the Arabian Peninsula 
in the eighteenth century from a reformist movement begun by Mohamed ibn abd al 
Wahhab (1703-1791) to return Islam to its original purity. Wahhab based his ideas on a 
strict interpretation of the Qur’an and his movement had as its central tenant the oneness 
of God. He condemned idolatry in all forms as well as anything that could possibly be 
interpreted as an intermediary to God, ordering the destruction of sacred tombs, shrines, 
and so on. He also not only allowed, but also called for waging war on fellow Muslims 
who had reverted back to a state of jahiliyyah – the state of barbarism and ignorance that 
prevailed in the Arabian Peninsula prior to Mohammed’s revelations. Wahhabism as a 
belief system, although not in itself necessarily militant, is the subset of Islam that has 
been used to inform the terrorist ideology, which lies at the base of the current worldwide 
salafi jihad. Wahhabism, interpreted in its most radical and militant type, also forms the 
ideological underpinning of Chechen terror groups. While the label Wahhabism denotes 
a totally other and neutral meaning in the Gulf States and elsewhere in the world, it 
should be understood that in Russia, Chechnya, the Caucuses, and the other former 
Soviet Union republics this label denotes an ultra-militant form of Islam and refers to 
militant religious groups that promote jihad and terrorism – so much so that in Russian 
the word “wahhabist” has become synonymous with terrorist. For the purposes of this 
paper we adhere to the Russian meaning of the word as it is understood in the Chechen 
context: we refer to Wahhabists in Chechnya as those groups that have formed according 
to a militant interpretation of Islam that promotes jihad and allows for and promotes 
terrorism. By doing so we mean no offense to Wahhabists who practice Islam peacefully 
in other parts of the world (or in Chechnya for that matter), and we fully acknowledge 
that this term has an entirely other, peaceful meaning outside of Chechnya.
7  See  Anne  Speckhard  and  Khapta  Akhmedova,  “The  New  Chechen  Jihad:  Militant 
Wahhabism  as  a  Radical  Movement  and  a  Source  of  Suicide  Terrorism  in  Post-War 78    Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova
Chechen Society,” Democracy and Security 2 (2006): 1-53; Anne Speckhard and Khapta 
Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 29, no. 5 (2006): 1-65; and Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “Mechanisms of 
Generating Suicide Terrorism.”
8  K. Akhmedova, “Fanatism and Revenge Idea of Civilians who had PTSD,” Social and 
Clinical  Psychiatry  12,  no.  3  (2003):  24-32.  See  also Anne  Speckhard,  Ken  Reidy,  Val 
Vanrompay, and Beatrice Jacuch, “Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber: A Thought 
Experiment,” unpublished research paper, 2005, for a discussion of revenge seeking in 
normal subjects taking part in a fantasy exercise.
9  R. Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (New York: 
The Free Press, 1992).
10  According to the American Psychiatric Association, dissociation is often a psychological 
symptom  following  deep  traumatization.  The  essential  feature  of  dissociation  is  “a 
disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or 
perception  of  the  environment,”  American  Psychiatric  Association,  Diagnostic  and 
Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders,  4th  ed.,  Washington,  DC,  1994.  In  the  case  of 
suicide terrorism, this means an emotional barrier is unconsciously erected, walling 
off  the  negative  emotions  generated  by  choosing  to  die  in  this  manner  and  may 
even include compartmentalizing the event from one’s ambitions and daily life. One 
Palestinian bomber, for example, when planning his attack, suggested that he could not 
carry a bomb until after his university exams – suggesting that while on the one hand 
he acknowledged that he was going to his death, he was able separate this reality so 
completely from his mind that he still felt that the need to complete his exams prior to 
going to explode himself. For a more complete discussion of this concept in relation to 
suicide terrorism see Speckhard and Akhmedova, “Mechanisms of Generating Suicide 
Terrorism” for an additional discussion of this factor in regard to Chechens; Speckhard 
and Akhmedova, “Talking to Terrorists”; Speckhard, “Understanding Suicide Terrorism: 
Countering Human Bombs and their Senders”; and Speckhard, Reidy, Vanrompay, and 
Jacuch, “Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber: A Thought Experiment.”
11  See John Reuter, “Chechnya’s Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout, or Deceived?” The 
American Committee for Peace in Chechnya publication, 2004, p. 21: “Having witnessed 
the almost total obliteration of their country in the past decade, the Chechen people 
have suffered immeasurably. This tiny mountain nation has endured an apocalyptic 
demographic crisis, with nearly 180,000 Chechens killed and over 300,000 displaced. 
These unfathomable numbers mean that one in two Chechens were either killed or 
driven from their homes in the past ten years. Moreover, Chechnya’s cities have been 
reduced to rubble and the extent of the environmental catastrophe is yet to be fully 
understood. Every single person alive today in Chechnya has been deeply scarred by 
the bloody conflict raging in their midst.” http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists    7
SuicideReport/, accessed June 1, 2005,
12  See Nichole Argo, “Culture, Society and Martyrdom,” unpublished research paper, 2004; 
Speckhard, “Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and their 
Senders.”
13  Zarema Mujikhoeva, the only bomber who did not carry out her act at the last moment, 
began the rumor of Black Fatima, an older woman that she claimed followed behind the 
female bombers to make sure they detonated and who was said to be able to detonate by 
remote. Mujikhoeva later discredited herself and admitted to lying, which was obvious 
from the fact that if Black Fatima actually existed it’s very unlikely Mujikhoeva would 
have been able to put her bomb-filled rucksack down and walk away from it without it 
being detonated by remote by this phantom figure.
14  See  Reuter,  “Chechnya’s  Suicide  Bombers:  Desperate,  Devout,  or  Deceived?”:  “The 
primary characteristic that differentiates the majority of Chechen suicide attackers from 
other suicide attackers around the world is the prominent role desperation and grief play 
in precipitating vulnerability to suicide terrorism. In most cases, all that is missing is a 
skilled recruiter that can operationalize these emotions and turn disenchanted Chechen 
women into radical shakhidi. As it turns out, Chechen suicide bombers are not wholly 
desperate, devout, or deceived, but instead they are desperate which allows them to be 
deceived into being devout,” p. 19.
15  See  Marc  Sageman,  Understanding  Terror  Networks  (Philadelphia:  University  of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Also see J. Post, E. Sprinzak, and L. Denny, “The Terrorists in 
Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003): 171-84 for a discussion of group dynamics and 
identity needs as motivational factors for joining and staying in a terror cell.
16  Within their homes Chechen women, like most women in the world, still do the majority 
of housework, cleaning, cooking, and childrearing tasks.
17  See Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers 
(Rodale  Books,  2003).  Speckhard  interviewed  many  of  the  same  families  Victor 
interviewed and received a very different explanation. Hence while it’s possible that 
feminist concerns – especially blocked social roles, the need to hide pregnancies or affairs 
– can be operational, Speckhard found these Palestinian women to have other issues 
than feminism as their main motivations.
18  See Anne Speckhard, “Soldiers for God: A Study of the Suicide Terrorists in the Moscow 
Hostage  Taking  Siege,”  in  The  Roots  of  Terrorism:  Contemporary  Trends  and  Traditional 
Analysis, ed. Oliver McTernan, Nato Science Series, Brussels, 2004; Anne Speckhard, 
Nadejda  Tarabrina,  Valery  Krasnov,  and  Khapta  Akhmedova,  “Research  Note: 
Observations of Suicidal Terrorists in Action,” in Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 2 
(2004): 305-27; Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide 
Terrorism”; A. Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, and N. Mufel, “Posttraumatic and 80    Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova
Acute Stress Responses in Hostages held by Suicidal Terrorists in the Takeover of a 
Moscow Theater,” Traumatology 11, no. 1 (2005); A. Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, 
and N. Mufel, “Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages 
Held by Suicidal Terrorists,” Traumatology: 11, no. 2 (2005, reprinted in S. Wessely & 
V. Krasnov, eds., Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO Russia Dialogue, 
2005, IOS Press). It should also be noted that rumours abound about this terror event. 
Some claim that since the male leadership of the terrorists in the Dubrovka Theater were 
calling on mobile phones to associates outside of the theater they, as well as the women, 
may have been waiting for orders about when to detonate the bombs, and lacking this 
outside order, the women failed to detonate. In either case the women were submissive 
to male orders.
19  Many  of  these  madrassas  targeted  and  preyed  upon  war  widows  and  their  young 
children, inviting the children to study for free, knowing that being fatherless because of 
the war they would be more receptive to the jihadist ideology. Nowadays these mosques 
and madrassas have been shut down by the Russians. See Anne Speckhard and Khapta 
Akhmedova, “The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a Radical Movement 
and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in Post-War Chechen Society,” Democracy and Security 
2 (2006): 1-53. 
20  Dmitri Trenin, Aleksei Malashenko, and Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The 
Chechnya  Factor  in  Post-Soviet  Russia  (Washington,  DC:  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International Peace, 2004); and Speckhard and Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: 
Chechen Suicide Terrorism Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.”
21  See Speckhard and Akhmedova, “The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a 
Radical Movement and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in Post-War Chechen Society.” Female Black Tigers: 
A Different Breed of Cat?
Arjuna Gunawardena
Suicide Cadres within the LTTE
The  Liberation  Tigers  of  Tamil  Eelam  (LTTE)  is  a  secular  separatist  terrorist 
organization in Sri Lanka whose goal is the establishment of an independent state 
of Tamil Eelam. Often considered the most ruthless terrorist organization in the 
world, the LTTE has used lethal force indiscriminately, and has in fact killed more 
Tamils  (including  Tamil  politicians  and  leaders  and  members  of  other  militant 
groups) than Sinhalese or the military. The organization has a centralized command 
structure under the direction of the national leader, Vellupullai Prabhakaran, and 
encompasses various operational/service wings and units. Each branch of service 
is divided by gender and has a secondary gender-based leadership, i.e., women’s 
military leader or women’s Sea Tiger leader, so that women cadres are under the 
operational control of the respective wing/unit leader, but under the administrative 
control of the women’s wing leader.
The LTTE did not pioneer the concept of martyrdom, but it successfully realized 
its efficacy and pursued it. The Black Tigers, the suicide terrorists within the LTTE, 
are not grouped in a separate unit, rather are integral members of any particular 
host LTTE wing/unit. And while all LTTE cadres carry a cyanide capsule to commit 
suicide rather than be captured,1 they are not all suicide terrorists. Instead, “Black 
Tigers”2 is a generic designation of all suicide cadres of the LTTE, those who set out 
intentionally to sacrifice their lives as an integral part of their mission.
The first LTTE suicide operation occurred on July 5, 1987. In an effort to offset 
heavy losses to the Sri Lankan army offensive, an explosives-filled truck was driven 
by a Tiger volunteer. Significant here is that circumstances, rather than ideology, 
dictated  the  operation;  that  is,  operational  exigencies  prompted  the  attack,  and 
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to March 1990 – there were no suicide bombings.3 The LTTE had not yet adopted 
suicide terrorism as an organizational ideal and had not yet established the Black 
Tiger suicide cadres, even though the concept of self-sacrificial attacks and pre-
emptive suicide was very much a part of the LTTE ethos. 
On July 10, 1990, following the withdrawal of the IPKF and exactly a month after 
the outbreak of hostilities between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka, a 
Sea Tiger craft rammed a Sri Lankan naval craft, which then exploded. While there 
was some ambiguity as to whether this was indeed a Black Tiger suicide attack, 
there is no doubt that the attack on November 22, 1990 was a Black Tiger suicide 
attack,4 when an explosives-laden truck driven by a male LTTE suicide bomber was 
used to spearhead the attack on the Mankulam army camp. The adoption of suicide 
terrorism came at a time when the LTTE, rebounding back from the attrition suffered 
during the IPKF period and after having decimated other Tamil groups, required a 
force multiplier to take on the government forces. It was in the post-IPKF period that 
the term “Black Tiger” came to be used.
A supportive collective environment has been carefully cultivated by the LTTE 
within the society over a period of more than two decades. In the context of the Black 
Tigers this is one of the most important motivational imperatives that encourage 
volunteers to the Black Tigers rather than religion, cause, mystic indoctrination, or 
individual personality characteristics. The LTTE has no political ideology (other than 
its separatist-nationalist stance) and is very much a grievance- based organisation. 
Therefore, the Black Tigers are used to fill this vacuum as a pseudo-ideology of 
sorts.  
As for the cadres themselves, there is little evidence that Black Tigers have any 
psychological  disorders  or  are  mentally  imbalanced.  Research  has  revealed  that 
while it may appear to be a rational choice by the individual – to volunteer to die-
to-kill – there are many other factors that come into play in the individual’s decision 
in becoming a suicide terrorist. Societal and peer pressure, social stigma by the 
dishonor bought about by refusal to become one, the social conditioning of Tamil 
society, and even economic reasons, all contribute. Self-sacrificial service has become 
a norm rather than an exceptional act, and is an outward display of commitment to 
the leader, the organization, and the cause. 
More than 316 Black Tigers have been killed over the years, including those who 
were killed by accidental explosions and training accidents. While the Sri Lankan 
military  hypothesizes  that  the  majority  of  the  Black  Sea  Tigers  are  LTTE  battle 
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evidence. A summary of the numbers by service and gender provides a picture of 
the distribution and ratio of male to female. The LTTE’s own numbers differ, in that 
they acknowledge only 273 killed. Of these, 196 were reportedly Black Sea Tigers, of 
whom fifty-six were said to be female. Of the remaining seventy-seven (i.e., Military 
Wing Black Tigers), eighteen were said to be female. The LTTE does not acknowledge 
the Intelligence Wing Black Tiger operations.
Table 1. Black Tiger (BT) Attacks and Casualties, 1987-2006
Service Wing Number of Black Tiger’s Killed Attacks
Male Female ? Total % of TTL No % of TTL
Military Wing BTs 58 18 3 7 25.00 30 23.62%
Black Sea Tigers 125 48 0 173 54.75 62 48.82%
Intelligence Wing BTs 44  11 64 20.25 35 27.56%
Totals 227 75 14 316 127+
? Gender has not been confirmed yet 
+ Does not include accidental explosions, etc.
A Different Breed?
Women  entered  Tamil  militancy  seven  years  after  their  male  counterparts,  and 
females were involved on the periphery of Tamil militancy until 1983, mostly in 
supportive logistical roles. The recruitment of women to the LTTE combat units 
expanded  during  and  after  the  IPKF  period,  and  was  clearly  more  for  military 
operational needs5 than any drive to empower Tamil women. From the women’s 
perspective,  ideological,  i.e.,  nationalist,  and  personal  motivations  appear  to  be 
the stronger imperatives, rather than feminism.6 According to Alsion, however, the 
LTTE’s female cadres also represent a type of feminist ideology, bolstering the LTTE 
contention that female emancipation is one of the key benefits it has achieved. While 
it has been estimated that a third of the combat strength of the LTTE are women,7 
with the LTTE themselves claiming it is 50 percent, the actual number might be 
closer to between 20-30 percent.8 Approximately 6,000 females cadres are said to 
have been killed in combat;9 although according to Thamilini, the women’s leader of 
their Political Wing, about 5,000 women have been killed out of an estimated 18,000+ 
LTTE cadres killed during the conflict. Considering that female cadres are invariably 
either spearheading attacks or are often in the thick of the battle, the casualty count 
does not necessarily match the 1:3 ratio of female to male cadres.84    Arjuna Gunawardena
It has been suggested that most women who join the LTTE do so out of a drive 
for liberation from traditional Hindu/Tamil cultural restrictions, in other words, 
female emancipation. This was cited as the reason female LTTE cadres are referred 
to as “Freedom Birds.” However, the term “Freedom Birds” was more a political 
and propaganda ploy of the LTTE than an instrument promoting empowerment 
and emancipation of women.10 On the ground neither they nor the female suicide 
cadres were referred to as such, despite erroneous claims to that effect.11 Nor were 
the female Black Tigers – sometimes referred to in the media as “Black Tigresses” – 
called the “Birds of Paradise.”12 The term “Freedom Birds” was propagated by Adele 
Balasingham13 as a generic name synonymous with the female cadres of the LTTE. 
But this is again part of the spin that the LTTE created, since women’s emancipation 
is touted both as an achievement and direct result of the LTTE’s liberation struggle 
(freedom from economic, political and social “bondage”14 is espoused by the LTTE in 
its propaganda) in an effort to generate much-needed recruits to the LTTE.
The first successful female Black Tiger operation was the assassination of Indian 
prime minister Rajiv Ghandi on May 21, 1991 in Sriperunpudur, India. Considering 
the time it initially took to select and train Black Tiger cadres, female cadres may have 
been selected from the early stages of the adoption of suicide terrorism, around the 
beginning of 1990. Though there has been much hype about the number of females 
in the ranks of the Black Tigers, statistically they constitute about 24 percent of the 
316 who were killed and identified as being Black Tigers, not including Black Tiger 
cadres arrested/captured and those known to be Black Tigers who committed suicide 
by taking cyanide. The number of Black Tiger cadres that neither killed themselves 
nor were captured is also unknown, and this presents difficulties in interpreting 
numbers and female representation.
The female suicide bomber in the context of the Tamil Tigers has more than 
political and organizational underpinnings. The social and cultural backdrop allows 
a fuller understanding of the phenomenon:
The self-sacrifice of the female bombers is almost an extension of the 
idea of motherhood in the Tamil culture, [as] in this strongly patriarchal 
society, Tamil mothers make great sacrifices for their sons on a daily 
basis; feeding them before themselves or the girl children, serving them 
and so on. Acting as a human bomb is an understood and accepted 
offering for a woman who will never be a mother.15 
Interestingly, in the past, there was no evidence to suggest that any of the female 
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bombers, married suicide bombers were a rarity, though a few existed. However, 
in the April 25, 2006 attack on the commander of the Sri Lanka armed forces, it was 
alleged that the suicide bomber was a pregnant woman. 
To de Mel, “the woman suicide bomber refutes conventional notions that women 
are essentially pacifist and peace-loving by nature.”16 She questioned whether the 
woman suicide bomber’s “act of destruction [is] a moment of victimhood or agency? 
As she explodes, is she both a victim and an agent of change? And what does she 
signify for the struggles for women’s empowerment and the future of the women’s 
movement?” According to Clara Beyler, 
There is a difference between men and women suicide attackers: women 
consider combat as a way to escape the predestined life that is expected 
of them. When women become human bombs, their intent is to make a 
statement not only in the name of a country, a religion, a leader, but also 
in the name of their gender.17
Beyler argued that this stems from the fact that a patriarchal structure dominates 
the societies in which suicide terrorists originate, including Kurd, Tamil, Palestinian, 
and Arab. However, LTTE women’s cadres were inducted to active combat units in 
equal fashion as the male cadres, received the same training, and were expected to 
perform equally well. The LTTE has spared no pains to assert that by this women 
were emancipated. Therefore, gender equality has already been established and does 
not require the extreme measure of women dying by suicide bombing missions to 
prove that they are equal to men. At the same time, Beyler also suggests that “a great 
number of LTTE women are victims of rape and that becoming a suicide bomber is 
the only redeeming option left.” Yet while there have been instances of rape, in the 
known cases the victims did not become Black Tigers or even members of the LTTE. 
This was a myth advanced by the LTTE itself for disinformation purposes, but finds 
little corroboration in reality. While alleged rapes of Tamil females by the Sri Lanka 
armed forces were reported, with some culprits brought before the law and convicted 
of such crimes, the incidents have been few and far between. The Sri Lanka military, 
which has been in combat continually for the past three decades, has matured and 
become more professional, and understands the importance of winning the hearts 
and minds of the Tamil populace, as much as winning battles in the overall effort 
in the war against separatist terrorism. During the IPKF period, rape of Sri Lankan 
Tamil females was rampant. This contributed significantly towards the militarization 
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and a chance to hit back at the IPKF. However, there is little evidence to suggest or 
support the contention that females raped by the IPKF turned to suicide terrorism as 
a means of revenge or as a redeeming option.
The  utilitarian  value  of  female  terrorists  because  of  certain  particular 
characteristics, i.e. practicality, coolness, dedication, inner strength, ruthlessness, 
and single-mindedness, has been posited.18 A dissenting view contends that “to view 
the female suicide bomber purely in terms of utilitarian purposes would diminish 
its true effectiveness. In reality, the female suicide bomber’s covert function is a 
liberating tool that challenges the inequality and subordinate status of women in 
Muslim society.”19 How far this is true in Tamil society, which is conservative and 
traditionalist and somewhat similar to Muslim society, is a question that must be 
addressed, keeping in mind the organizational characteristics of the organization 
that  operates  the  female  suicide  cadres,  the  LTTE.  The  LTTE’s  consideration  of 
women’s emancipation has always been subordinate to the overarching goal of Tamil 
Eelam. Utility is the rationale more than any other motive. The women, particularly 
in leadership positions, toe the LTTE line and pay lip service to the “struggle for 
emancipation,” but the reality is different.
There are indeed practical advantages that females have over the males. These 
include  “tactical  advantages  conferred  by  their  seemingly  innocent  outward 
appearance and the universal perception of their non-violent character. These enable 
them more easily to bypass security measures and (security) personnel less suspicious 
of their intentions. These considerations must overcome the inhibitions grounded in 
the norms regarding the status of women in the traditional societies in which they 
operate.”20 Another aspect in the use of female perpetrators in suicide terrorism that 
has received little attention is that women’s participation is not just a means, but 
an end in itself. By portraying the participation of the “weaker” sex as the victim of 
circumstances (e.g.,  rape) that drove these women to desperate measures, women 
are in fact used (or abused) as a justification for suicide terrorism, or at the very least 
in the case of the LTTE to make Black Tiger operations/suicide terrorism acceptable 
to the world at large.  This disinformation was the main justification put forward by 
the LTTE for the suicide attack on Rajiv Gandhi, wherein the bomber was portrayed 
as the victim of an IPKF rape and that the attack was more her personal vendetta 
rather than a politically motivated assassination. What is less publicized is that on 
this occasion, there were two female suicide bombers tasked for this target – the 
second as a standby in reserve. The high level of planning and organizing that was 
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”Rebel  groups  deliberately  use  personal  distress  to  recruit  women  because 
theatrical acts of female suicide bombing with overtones of martyrdom and national 
liberation  receive  immense  media  coverage  and  widespread  public  attention.”22 
Additionally, suicide terrorism in general and female suicide bombers in particular 
are  used  to  increase  a  group’s  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  the  movement’s  own 
supporters. Stern raised concerns that terrorist profiling takes into consideration 
male perpetrators rather than female and this is a deficiency in the counterterrorist 
mechanisms  of  security  forces  in  the  West.23  Terrorists  will  no  doubt  use  such 
loopholes to breach security and conduct suicide terrorist attacks.
However, as in the case of the Chechen Black Widows, who have aroused in the 
Russian security forces and intelligence organizations a heightened awareness, the 
attention of the Sri Lankan intelligence and security forces over the years has come 
to address the female suicide bomber threat – particularly in off-battlefield areas, 
e.g., Colombo and in VIP protection. This has more to do with the reality of suicide 
terrorism in Sri Lanka than any particular difference attributed to the female of the 
suicide terrorist species. Therefore, one might add that the advantages previously 
enjoyed by female suicide cadres in Sri Lanka have been offset to some extent by the 
increased awareness and attention they have brought upon themselves.
Yet  heightened  awareness  notwithstanding,  lack  of  training  tends  to  permit 
suicide terrorist attacks anyway, as was demonstrated when a female Black Tiger was 
taken into custody on suspicion and blew herself up inside a Colombo police station 
in July 2004. In the attack on the commander of the Sri Lanka armed forces inside the 
high security army headquarters complex on April 25, 2006, the thirty-four year old 
suicide bomber, Kanapathipillai Manjula Devi, was allegedly pregnant. Posing as the 
wife of a soldier on her way to the maternity clinic, this cover story enabled her to 
gain relatively easy access into the high security complex where the army hospital is 
located. On at least two previous occasions she had gained access to the complex on 
the same basis, had not gone to the maternity clinic itself, and used the opportunity 
to stake out her the target ground. Subsequent investigations in fact confirmed that 
she was not pregnant and that it was a clever disguise. Despite the lax security, the 
attack itself failed, and with it the LTTE lost a great deal strategically, including the 
supportive environment it enjoyed from its own Tamil constituency in the areas they 
controlled. Women are traditionally seen as “life-givers” rather than “life-takers”: 
the LTTE has turned them into human bombs. Although sending a female to self-
destruct as a suicide bomber in itself departs from accepted conventions, against 
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a necessity of circumstances, as an asymmetrical response to the much stronger 
adversary, the Sri Lanka military. However, the revulsion at the decision of using a 
“pregnant” woman has had adverse effects on the LTTE, both from the international 
community as well as from within the Tamil community itself.  
According to Ayers,
Terrorist organizations have a choice whether to adopt suicide bombing 
or restrict themselves to conventional bombing tactics…most suicide 
bombings occur in “marginal” democracies or authoritarian regimes 
demonstrating  that  perhaps  repressive  societal  conditions  play  a 
greater role in choosing suicide bombing….The presence of repressive 
conditions  is  a  necessary  condition  for  terrorist  organizations  to 
develop cults of martyrdom capable of successfully recruiting suicide 
bombers.24
If repressive conditions support the recruiting and perpetuation of suicide terrorism, 
then the opposite – tolerant conditions – should have the opposite positive effect.   
During  the  past  decade  or  so,  there  has  been  greater  movement  by  successive 
governments towards addressing the root causes of the ethnic problem and devolving 
administrative and political power to the provinces/regions.
The low-key commemoration of Black Tiger Day on July 5, 2006 indicated the 
LTTE’s appreciation of the reality on the ground, namely, the changing perceptions 
of its constituency. However, the rhetoric remains intransigent and the importance of 
retaining the Black Tigers was expounded by the LTTE leadership as “an indispensable 
weapon in the LTTE arsenal who had played a decisive role.”25 Indeed, the message 
had just been transmitted nine days prior, when on June 26, 2006, a Black Tiger on 
an explosive-laden motorbike rode into the car of the third highest ranking army 
officer, Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Parami Kulathunga,26 killing him and several 
others, including a civilian on his way to work.
Together with the practical difficulties posed by heightened awareness of the 
threat posed by female Black Tigers and resulting greater alertness of security forces, 
and the adverse repercussions of the “pregnant” suicide bomber, the peace dividend 
of a forbearing atmosphere resulting from almost three years of the ceasefire augers 
well for the future of countering the LTTE Black Tigress threat. Despite the hype, the 
numbers clearly indicate that female suicide bombers have not been a significantly 
greater threat than their male counterparts in Sri Lanka. Nor is there an appreciable 
difference between the male and female Black Tigers. There are indications that their 
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suicide bombers is waning, despite reports from an arrested alleged female Black 
Tiger of twelve female suicide cadres who have been tasked to attack VIP targets 
in the deep south.27 However, suicide attacks from their male counterparts remain 
an  evermore  increasing  threat  in  the  escalating  intensity  of  the  conflict,  despite 
the ceasefire agreement., particularly against high profile targets, i.e., political and 
military leadership, critical infrastructure, and economically sensitive targets.28 
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Female Suicide Terrorism
Maria Alvanou
Following the terrorist strikes that shook the United States on September 11, 2001, 
the phenomenon of suicide attacks became a topic of particular interest to terrorism 
analysts, psychologists, government officials, and much of the general public in 
various regions of the world. Special attention has turned to the use of women 
as suicide attackers, as it appears to be a broadening trend among Chechen and 
Palestinian groups.1
Yet  despite  the  media  sensation  that  it  created,  the  phenomenon  of  female 
suicide terror has not earned widespread attention in the academic literature, and 
to date only a handful of scholarly articles have been published on the subject. 
Most studies are oriented towards the issue of suicide terrorism in general and then 
concern themselves with particular interpretations that touch on religious, cultural, 
or psychological dimensions. In addition, the majority of academic approaches are 
derived from theories of collective violence in the field of political science, with 
others emerging from the disciplines of psychology, international relations, religion, 
and economics. Among this plethora of studies, a further methodological question 
can be put forward: What has criminology to offer in the study of terrorism? And 
beyond that, what about female suicide bombers is worth examining?
Criminology and the Study of Suicide Terrorism
Perhaps predictably, the fields of study that until now have dealt with terrorism have 
been largely confined to their own theoretical perspectives: political scientists focus 
particularly on the relationship between terrorism and the state, policy programs, and 
political institutions; international studies scholars investigate the subject in terms of 
the complicated interfaces between nations and other localities; and psychologists 
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actor. Moreover, suicide missions, like terrorism in general, have been discussed 
and analyzed as a mode of warfare, a method of struggle, a strategy of insurgency, 
and a form of political protest, with all these ever challenged by the same question 
of “terrorism or freedom fighting,” accompanied by the ongoing problem of what 
constitutes terrorism or what defines its absence.2
The  semantic  and  political  controversies  aside,  there  is  no  question  that  the 
threat or use of murder, injury, or destruction are all crimes, committed to coerce 
the government or other target groups into conceding to the demands of the said 
terrorist(s). In particular, the suicide attack is a bloody and intensely violent act of 
homicide, often resulting in multiple fatalities and numerous injuries. Thus more 
than the source of tremendous horror, it is above all a crime. Yet few scholars3 have 
taken the issue of suicide terrorism to the fore of the criminological debate and they 
are indeed a minority within criminology’s limited contribution to the study of 
the general phenomenon of terrorism.4 This is surprising because the raison d’être 
of criminology is to address criminal behavior; breaking of laws has long been 
the central concern of criminology, and a suicide mission – even if not labeled as 
terrorism – is closely related to legal transgression.
Criminologists relate to the notion of a crime with reference to its legal context, 
that is, as a violation of a law, and eschew the non-technical, frequent usage of “crime” 
to mean any evil act. Here the advantage of criminology over other disciplines is 
that the controversial ethical dimension in terrorism’s ideological construction has 
little meaning whatsoever. A suicide attack as a method of intentional killing of 
others is legitimately researched in depth as homicide, overcoming arguments of a 
“just cause.” While terrorist organizations usually describe themselves as national 
liberation movements, fighters against social, economic, or religious oppression or a 
combination of these,5 the validity of their argument has little to do with their violent 
act.6 Some groups undoubtedly do fight for self-determination or national liberation, 
but not all resort to terrorism. Some groups are both terrorist and liberationist; some 
are either and some are neither. But what is important is whether their missions violate 
international law or the law of the territory where they operate and concentrate their 
activities. In such a case, regardless of any potential virtue or justification, they can 
be more than legitimately considered the object of criminological research.
Suicide bombings, apart from the particular national homicide law they violate 
(depending on where the attacks occur), also fall into the category of crimes against 
humanity. Although the definition of this term might differ slightly from treaty 
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civilians  by  an  organization  or  government.7  Unlike  war  crimes,  crimes  against 
humanity may be committed in times of peace or in periods of unrest that do not 
rise to the level of an armed conflict.8 The most recent definition of crimes against 
humanity is contained in the Rome Statute of the ICQ, which entered into force on 
July 1, 2002. The statute defines crimes against humanity as the “participation in and 
knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population,” and 
“the multiple commission of [such] acts…against any civilian population, pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” The 
statute’s introduction defines “policy to commit such attack” to mean that the state 
or organization actively promoted or encouraged such attacks against a civilian 
population. The elements of the “crime against humanity of murder” require that: 
(1) “the perpetrator killed one or more persons” (2) “the conduct was committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population” and 
(3) “the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of, or intended the conduct to be 
part of, a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”9
The suicide mission, moreover, from a criminal law perspective, is a murder act 
with a particular mens rea: the willingness to kill combined with the willingness to 
die,10 with the latter expressed as the specific operational method to accomplish the 
first objective. We are actually dealing with a combined violent act, one of special 
characteristics. This is why the component element “suicide” may be misleading, 
because the main objective of the mission is not suicide but mass homicide, albeit 
carried out by means of self-destruction designed to inflict lethal harm on others.11 
The suicide terrorist actually becomes a human time bomb in order to hurt others and 
clearly needs to be distinguished from an ordinary person who entertains suicidal 
tendencies.12 For the suicide bomber, it is not the determination to kill him or herself, 
but rather the determination to kill the enemy that is the driving force.13
Female Suicide Terrorism
But what is so special and particular about women suicide bombers? Why should 
any research on suicide terrorism be focused on them? Apart from women’s seeming 
innocence and assumed aversion to violence – which are the key reasons terrorist 
groups use them in order to bypass security measures and easily avoid detection 
– from an operational point of view there doesn’t seem to be any other difference 
between female and male perpetrators. Irrespective of the perpetrator’s gender, the 
definition of a suicide attack remains the same: an “operational method in which the 
very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator. The terrorist is 94    Maria Alvanou
fully aware that if she/he does not kill her/himself, the planned attack will not be 
implemented.”14
Still, there is an additional “bonus” of female suicide terrorism: many organizations 
deliberately recruit women for strategic purposes, because female suicide bombers 
receive even more media attention than their male equivalents. Women who kill 
or threaten to kill are “hot news.” It is a reaction that knows “no state or religious 
boundaries.”15 Their media shock value is a lot higher than that of men, and as research 
has shown, “public perceptions of the level of terrorism in the world appear to be 
determined not by the level of violence, but rather by the quality of the incidents, the 
location, and the degree of media coverage.”16 While generally with suicide attacks 
the terrorists put together an operational “package that is so spectacular, so violent, 
so compelling, that the [media,] acting as executives, supplying the cameras and the 
audience, cannot refuse the offer,”17 making the suicide bomber the ultimate victim 
of the act while claiming moral high ground,18 there is an additional value when the 
perpetrator is a woman. People around the world try to comprehend the motivations 
of such an act, and the underlying message is that the present environment these 
women lived in must have been so humiliating that death is preferable to life under 
such conditions,19 even for those creatures that are programmed by nature to breed 
and sustain life. The fact that the attacker was willing to cast her own life with those 
of her victims permits a sympathetic audience to balance out and “soften” the crime.20 
This position does indeed earn sympathy:21 suddenly the media finds superficial 
similarities between perpetrator and victim, implying some sort of commonality.22 
If “terrorism is theatre,”23 then the play particularly hits the box office when women 
are starring.
But criminology has more reasons to deal with women suicide terrorists than their 
great echo effect in the media. Criminology is an applied discipline that searches 
for the causes of crime in order to eradicate the problem. What is unique to it and 
indeed is its defining characteristic is the central question about the causes of crime 
and the ultimate focus on the offender, rather than on mechanisms of discipline and 
regulation that go beyond the limits of the field of crime. The actor, the offender, 
the criminal is the key in interpreting, analyzing, and ideally combating the crime. 
Gender and its social implications are an important factor of every person’s activity 
and as a result, also of the illegal actions attributed to a deviant person.
It is an established fact that males and females differ biologically and undergo 
diverse  and  different  sociological  influences  too,  such  as  gender-specific  role 
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quite provocative, the idea that “the enemy is within every woman, but is not her 
reproductive biology, rather it is the habit regarding it into which she has been led 
by centuries of male domination”24  is not that distant from reality.25 The unequal 
position of women in society due to social oppression and economic dependency 
on men and the state, especially in the environments where female suicide terrorism 
occurs, has to be examined. Feminist perspectives over the past thirty years have not 
only added some new topics under the criminological umbrella; they have challenged 
the theories, concepts, methods, and assumptions of most of the people already 
involved in the study of crime. Most theories of criminality have been developed 
from male subjects and validated on male subjects. While there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this methodology, the problem is that these theories have been extended 
generally to include all criminals, defendants, and prisoners. It was assumed that 
the theories would apply to women; yet most do not appear to do so because they 
do not consider the special circumstances of female reality. Social and economic 
conditions, environmental influences, cultural traditions, and physiological factors 
must all be taken into account when dealing with female criminality and female 
suicide terrorism.
The problem of suicide “martyrs” is particularly difficult to understand. The 
perpetrators are willing not merely to risk their lives, but to commit themselves to 
die for their cause. It is this apparent readiness to sacrifice oneself that makes the 
threat of suicide terrorism so large and so incomprehensible, as most of us cannot 
imagine ourselves committing any such act. Suicide bombings seem to epitomize 
the violence of irrationality. They are a form of an extraordinary self-immolation, 
an act that operates against the most basic of all human instincts, self-preservation. 
When women are involved, the issue becomes even more perplexing, especially 
when these women were brought up in a cultural environment that dictates their 
roles as mothers and submissive creatures. We are more used to mad, bad, ruthless, 
male terrorists, though their actions as suicide bombers defy our understanding; 
on the other hand, women exploding themselves totally destroy their traditional 
gender roles of nurturing caregivers.
There is a major question about the interpretation of female criminality, which 
doesn’t  extend  much  beyond  the  early  theories  of  the  experts  in  delinquency.26 
In fact, we still tend to attribute female deviant behavior to particular biological 
or  psychological  traits  and  ignore  interactioning  and  sociological  parameters. A 
common image of the deviant woman as “non-woman” – masculine or unfeminine 
– is the most popular when discussing the feminine role in terrorism and political 96    Maria Alvanou
deviance. The female terrorist, engaging in illegal activity, traditionally considered 
the domain of men, purportedly engages in this activity because she is in essence 
masculine and thus often portrayed as unisexed, unattractive, and unnatural. This is 
especially so when she does not engage in sidekick activity, but contributes actively 
and essentially to the terrorist group operations.27 Female terrorists have traditionally 
been described as cruel, crueler in fact than their male comrades.28 Even today, 
women are generally measured as deviant according to attitudes that derive largely 
from classical Greece, Rome, and medieval Europe, be they of pagan mythology or 
Judeo-Christian theology.29 The mega-proportioned violence of suicide attacks is a 
further challenge to break stereotypes and discover how given their boundaries, 
role, and function in society women can indeed commit the same criminal acts as 
men, even the most hideous ones.
Just as women’s roles in societies have customarily been distinguished from 
men’s roles,30 so too their roles in warring have also been clearly delineated with 
unmistakably demarcated boundaries. Society, through its body of rules and its 
numerous  institutions,  has  conventionally  dictated  the  female  roles  within  the 
boundaries of militancy. Though nationalist movements invite women to participate, 
“on the other hand they reaffirm the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine 
conduct and exert pressure on women to articulate their gender interests within 
the terms of reference set by nationalist discourse.”31 Assisting in subordinate roles 
has always been welcomed and encouraged, but actually active fighting in the war 
has not. Thus women have had to demand to be integrated in all aspects of war, 
including frontline fighting.32 In the context of wars and conflicts, women have 
tended to be classified within the single category “women and children,” as the 
vulnerable victims who suffer under violence with no means of defense. Yet women 
are not necessarily vulnerable and certainly have needs, experiences, and roles in 
war that differ from those of children.33 Furthermore, women have been and are 
actively engaged in many armed conflicts around the world, playing their own part 
in wars throughout history.34
So  the  question  remains,  what  leads  women  to  support  and  join  violent 
organizations and commit atrocious acts? Paraphrasing Simone de Beauvoir, women 
suicide bombers are not born; they are made. Suicide terrorism is a social fact in the 
Durkheimian sense, and it ought to “be explained not as an individual psychological 
aberration but as the product of specific social conditions.”35 Rather than trying to 
figure out what kind of woman becomes a suicide bomber, it may be more useful 
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One can examine the processes by which a woman might be encouraged to fulfill a 
specific role. It is furthermore essential to link the female presence in terrorist groups 
to social developments of particular interest to women in the societies where the 
terrorist groups recruit and operate. Some groups espouse ideologies that inhibit 
women from joining them while others do not,36 and in some cases female suicide 
terrorism has not been welcomed by terrorist groups themselves.37
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict represents an opportunity and example to study 
female suicide terrorism in the context of an ongoing conflict and within the terms 
of a patriarchal society. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip launched a 
campaign  of  suicide  attacks  as  part  of  their  operational  tactics  since  1993  and 
especially after the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. The volume of 
terrorism perpetrated against Israel during the first two years of this intifada was 
unprecedented in the country’s history38 and was a seismic shock to most observers. 
After January 2002 with the self-detonation of Wafa Idris,39 Palestinian women have 
heightened their involvement in the conflict40 by joining the ranks of men who use 
themselves as human bombs and commit acts of suicide bombing. In the framework 
of the second intifada, women have proven to be a valuable and precious weapon 
in  the  fight  against  Israel.  It  is  no  exaggeration  that  they  have  become  critical 
components of the new Palestinian human precision bomb41 that operates against 
the undeniable military supremacy of the Israelis. On the Palestinian streets suicide 
bombings carried out by women are deemed as a response weapon to the enemy’s 
structured armed forces: “The Israelis have women in their army. We do not have F-
16s, rockets or tanks. But these girls are our rockets. It’s OK for our girls to fight the 
Jews.”42 Though not necessarily with the conscious goal of breaking down gender 
roles, the female suicide bombers have nonetheless found themselves challenging 
traditional cultural standards of Palestinian society.43 Given the specific traits (social-
cultural-religious) of Palestinian society and the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the question is what drives the female involvement in suicide attacks. How 
is it that Palestinian women, brought up and living in a patriarchal society with 
strong and growing Islamic influence and predetermined careers as mothers and 
breeders and who are minimally represented in “common” criminality, engage in 
this type of violent and deadly activity?
Conclusion
Aristotle argued over 2000 years ago that it was legitimate to resist tyranny, yet he 
provided no arguments as to which means were legitimate.44 Until today, although 98    Maria Alvanou
we  still  cannot  agree  in  defining  legally  what  activity  can  be  characterized  as 
“terrorism,” we can all repeat the famous words, “I can’t define it but I know when 
I see it.”45 Most important, we all feel the need to explain it and finally combat it. Yet 
human bombs, this fashionable weapon of today’s terror campaigns, pose an extra 
difficulty, as they are perceived by many as most difficult to prevent and repel: how 
can someone actually stop and deter a person who is not afraid of giving up life? The 
appearance of women in this kind of murder activity has complicated the question, 
as their gender makes it quite difficult to detect let alone understand them, due to 
existing images and perceptions about the female role in society and crime.
Usually  security  services,  policymakers,  and  analysts  have  little  conceptual 
understanding of how the factors contributing to terrorism, as well as the various 
social parameters, actually affect the individual terrorist. Instead they seem to believe 
strongly that hard-line policies will prevent terrorism because terrorists want to 
avoid high costs. The prescriptions dictated by this approach are quite attractive, 
because they are conventional, compatible with the existing political doctrine, and 
relatively easy to implement. Few efforts have been made thus far to devise an 
analytical framework for understanding the processes and factors that underlie the 
development of the suicide bomber and the execution of suicide bombing attacks, 
and even fewer about the female actors. Yet to date the approach has contributed 
little in combating suicide terrorism, where the perpetrators clearly are oblivious to 
the physical cost of their actions. 
If multiple factors are likely to underlie any one observation,46 this undoubtedly 
applies to suicide terrorism, which is a complex phenomenon not caused by one 
single factor and not to be adequately explained by one overarching motivation. In 
order to understand it there is a need to appreciate the ethnic, religious, political, 
social, and economic context in which it takes place.47 If perceived as a crime, then 
any factor that affects or concerns the perpetrator also has to be analyzed in order to 
break down the pattern of deviance and deter it adequately. 
Gender  is  one  of  these  crucial  factors,  so  the  female  participation  in  suicide 
terrorism merits special research, since the cultural, social, and religious standards 
in the terrorism arenas put women in a very different position than that of men. They 
are “special” deviants, not because the operational method of their self-immolation 
differs from that of men, but because their womanhood plays a key role in the way the 
whole social environment influences them. It is the specific province of criminology, 
which involves studying the manifestations of crime and social control in relation to 
law as well as the conditions, processes, and implications at the societal level, that Criminological Perspectives on Female Suicide Terrorism    
contributes to identifying and analyzing female suicide attacks. Thus, criminology 
can offer valuable explanations to the formidable goals of counterterrorism, which 
in turn will be better able to try to combat or modify the special characteristics of this 
form of female criminal behavior.
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